Katsina
Katsina, it will be remembered, was one of the
original Hausa States and had always been in the first flight. Its
capital, with walls nearly eight miles in circumference, was an
important centre in the trades of both the Sahara and the Sudan and
its people were renowned throughout Hausaland for their learning.
In earlier times Katsina's main rival had been
Kano and wars between them had been frequent. But in the eighteenth
century the Gobirawa, after their move from Air, had become the
principal enemy. As a result, after Gobir had defeated Zamfara and
occupied half its territory, Katsina had supported the Zamfara
diehards and kept their resistance alive, particularly in the town
of Kiyawa. This had led to intermittent but long-drawn-out
hostilities which had weakened both sides and which had not come to
an end until the Katsinawa had defeated and killed Sarkin Gobir
Yakuba in 1801.
Katsina is good country for cattle and at the
beginning of the nineteenth century there were undoubtedly plenty of
Fulani among its people. There is no record of Shehu
having made any of his tours there, but he must at least have
traversed the State when he visited Daura and he was certainly well
known to the local Moslems, because some of them had been his
pupils.
When the jihad began, the Hausas of Katsina
were probably not sorry to see the Gobirawa in difficulties.
Certainly, although an appeal was made to them, they sent no help to
Yunfa before the battle
of Tabkin Kwatto. After
the battle, however, they seem to have been quick to perceive that Shehu
constituted a new force which might threaten them as well as Gobir. Yunfa
pointed the moral in a letter which he wrote at this time to all his
brother Chiefs. There had been a small fire in Gobir, he wrote, and
because he had neglected to stamp it out, it had flared up and burnt
him. Let them be warned by his experience 1.
Yunfa's letter probably reached the Chief of
Katsina before the conciliatory message which Shehu sent at about
the same time. At any rate, when Shehu's letter was brought to him
he did not hesitate, as did the Chiefs of Kano and Zazzau, but
simply tore it up.
— Even so, Bello
wrote afterwards, did God tear up his kingdom and his power 2.
In Katsina, as in other Hausa States, Yunfa's
message gave the signal for the outlawing of the reformers and the
Fulani to begin.
— When Sarkin Katsina heard what had happened
to Sarkin Gobir he commanded his Chiefs to make war upon all who
were allied to Shehu.
Then the Katsina Chiefs combined to kill and capture them until our
people came into the open and banded themselves together in large
bodies and set to work to arm themselves 3.
Two such bodies fought their way westward in
the late rains of 1804 and reached Shehu
when he was making his way to southern Zamfara. They were the first
important reinforcements to reach him, and must have been doubly
welcome 4.
Meanwhile their comrades who had remained
behind in Katsina and Daura had alarmed the Hausa Chiefs
sufficiently to cause them to try to join forces with the Chief of
Kano, with the object of crushing the Fulani risings. Contingents
led by Sarkin Katsina and Sarkin Daura actually set out for Kano,
but found their way barred by strong Fulani forces under Dan Tunku,
the future Emir of Kazaure, who defeated them and compelled them to
turn back 5.
Among Shehu's personal followers was a Fulani
called Umaru Dallaji. He
seems to have fought at Tabkin
Kwatto and the other early battles of the jihad, but after the
subjugation of Kebbi and the defection of Zamfara, that is to say in
the middle of 1805, he was sent to take charge of operations in his
native Katsina. His arrival fortunately coincided with the defeat of
the Hausas by Dan Tunku.
He was therefore able to take the offensive straight away and
capture many towns in the southern part of the State.
One of the places which did not fall to Umaru Dallaji was Yandoto, a town which had long been celebrated as
a seat of learning 6.
Its Mallams had never accepted Shehu's
teaching and since the start of the jihad they had been
maintaining that he was in error and guilty of deceiving and
misleading the people 7.
In a war that was being fought on issues of religious principle such
a centre of opposition was of course more dangerous than a hostile
army. For the reformers it was therefore imperative that this
strident voice of dissent should either be won over or else stifled.
And so towards the end of 1805, as soon as Kebbi had been subdued
again after the rising that followed the battle of Alwasa, Bello was
dispatched to Katsina Laka, the southern part of the State, to deal
with Yandoto and to reinforce and direct Umaru Dallaji's operations 8.
With him Bello
took Muhammadu Ashafa, a
Fulani from this part of Katsina 9
who had himself studied in Yandoto, but who had been expelled when
he had declared for Shehu.
When Bello arrived before
the town he sent Muhammadu to the people with a message saying that
he had not come with the intention of making war on them but in the
hope of settling all differences by discussion. They spurned this
overture, however, and refused either to see Bello
or to listen to what he had to say. This rebuff proved too much for Bello's
patience and so, without further ado, he moved up his forces and
took the town 10.
After this, still accompanied by Umaru Dallaji and Muhammadu
Ashafa and now with the support of another influential Fulani
called Muhammadu dan Alhaji,
Bello went on to exploit
his success. He captured many other Hausa towns and subdued a group
of local Fulani who had been assisting the Hausa régime 11.
When southern Katsina (which at this time also
included the Chafe-Gusau-Kanoma area) had been secured, Bello
decided that the time had come for him to return to Shehu. He therefore presented flags to Umaru Dallaji and Muhammadu
dan Alhaji, as symbols of their authority, and ordered them to move
north, into the centre of the State, and attack Awai and Ranko 12
while Muhammadu
Ashafa remained in Katsina Laka to consolidate the territory
that had already been won 13.
Ranko and Awai soon fell. The Hausas, under the
Ubandawaki, launched a
counter-attack against Ranko, but this was repulsed and they were
compelled to fall back on the capital 14.
The way was now open for the decisive blow.
But before any attempt was made to deliver it,
another powerful ally was recruited to Shehu's cause, namely Umaru Dumyawa, the Chief of the Sullubawa in Katsina. The Sullubawa,
like the Toronkawa, were not pure Fulani but part Fulani and part Mandingo. They had come with the Fulani from
Senegal, however, and they shared their outlook and way of life.
Those settled in Gobir and Kebbi had already
thrown in their lot with Shehu
and now Umaru Dumyawa also took up arms.
As his people were settled in the north of the
State, which was still in the hands of the Hausas, his accession to
the cause was of particular importance. He too was therefore
rewarded with a flag 15.
In the dry season of 1806-7, while Muhammadu
Ashafa held the south and Umaru Dumyawa the north, Umaru Dallaji and
Muhammadu dan Alhaji closed in on the capital 16.
The siege was a long one and food became so short in the city that a
lizard fetched 50 cowries and a vulture 500 17.
At one point the Chief sued for terms but his overtures were
referred to Bello who, suspecting treachery, rejected them 18.
Soon afterwards Muhammadu dan Alhaji died.
Umaru Dallaji intensified the pressure, however, and at last forced
the Hausas to come out and fight in the open. In the ensuing battle
the Fulani were completely victorious, the Hausa Chief being killed
and his army forced to yield up the city and fall back on Dankama in
the north 19.
The capture of Katsina was a major success, but
in neighbouring Gobir and Zamfara the war was far from over. Soon
afterwards, therefore, Umaru Dallaji went off to help Namoda, the
leader of the Zamfara Fulani, in the task of containing Alkalawa. It
was probably during his absence that the Katsina Hausas, under their
new Chief, Magajin Halidu, launched a surprise counter-attack and
recaptured the City 20.
The Hausas, however, lacked the strength to
exploit this unexpected success, or even to hold Katsina, and they
fell back to Dankama. There, soon afterwards, they were attacked by
Umaru Dallaji, who had come hurrying back from Alkalawa accompanied
by the Zamfara Fulani under Namoda, and by a contingent sent up from
Kano 21.
This combined force defeated the Hausas and took the town. Among
those who were killed was the new Chief, who either fell in the
fighting or, as some say, committed suicide by jumping down a well 22.
After the victory at Dankama Shehu recognized Umaru Dallaji as the first Fulani Emir 23
of Katsina. There remained, however, the problem of how to find
suitable fiefs for the families of the other two flag-holders. It
was solved by a compromise which, if it did not satisfy everyone, at
least kept the peace and prevented the Emirate from being broken up.
Alhaji's flag had been inherited by his son, Mamman
Dikko. He was now appointed warden of the western marches and
given the title of Yandakka. Furthermore, though he was expected to accept the local
leadership of the new Emir, he was nevertheless allowed to do
homage in Sokoto instead of Katsina and the appointment of his
successors was retained in the hands of the Sultans of Sokoto and
not delegated to the Emirs of Katsina. The other flag-bearer, Umaru
Dumyawa, who was still alive, was given the title of Sarkin
Sullubawa and accorded similar privileges 24.
This solution had the effect of circumscribing the power of the
Emirs of Katsina and consequently their rule never became as
autocratic as those of some of
the other Emirs.
The early victory in Katsina played an
important part in the jihad and particularly in the decisive
struggle against Gobir. First of all it convinced waverers
everywhere that Shehu's
supporters were really capable of winning the war. Secondly, as
already described, it isolated Gobir from the other Hausa States and
cut off any prospect of help coming from them or from Bornu.
Thirdly, it helped Namoda to complete the pacification of eastern
Zamfara. Finally, it released important forces with the result that
both the Katsina contingent under Umaru Dallaji and the Zamfara
contingent under Namoda were able to take part in the final siege
and storming of Alkalawa.
On the Hausa side the great mass of the
peasantry had probably taken little part in the war and they now
accepted the new régime without protest. For the ruling classes,
however, it was a different story. It was they, with their slaves
and feudal levies, who had persecuted the reformers and then taken
the field against them. During the war they had first been driven
back into the city and then forced to flee the country altogether.
As soon as they had gone, the victors, who were mainly Fulani, were
free to take possession of their houses and step into the public
offices which they had occupied. This process went on all over the
Emirate, in the villages and hamlets as well as the towns, and it
explains why the seizure of power was so
thorough and far-reaching.
As for the Hausa diehards, though defeated and
driven into exile, they were by no means finished. After the death
of Magajin Halidu they appointed Dan Kasuwa to be their Chief 25.
Under him they had at first to fall back on the neighbouring State
of Damagaram, but they rallied later and established themselves
round Maradi in what had previously been the northern corner of
their kingdom. This foothold they managed to retain for the rest of
the century and when they had recovered some of their former
strength they became, as we shall see, a most painful thorn in the
side of the Fulani.
Kano
Kano had always been the richest and most
populous of the Hausa States and at the end of the eighteenth
century its capital was probably the greatest city in the whole
Sudan. In a political and military sense, however, it was not as
strong as it appeared to be. Its people, perhaps even more than most
Hausas, were absorbed in their own pursuits, particularly their very
extensive trade, and had little time or zeal to spare for other
things. Even The Kano Chronicle, which clearly glosses over much
that was discreditable or unflattering, cannot altogether conceal
the fact that their record in war was a poor one.
The country, like neighbouring Katsina, was
well suited to cattle and by the beginning of the nineteenth century
the Fulani had penetrated the State in some strength. Most of them
indeed had been established for so many generations that they no
longer thought of themselves as members of the clans to which they
had originally belonged but on the contrary, as their nomenclature
shows, had formed new groups based on the territories in which they
had become settled or semi-settled.
In the city the most important group of Fulani
were the Mundubawa. To the north-west there were the Yolawa, to the
north the Dambazawa, to the south-east the Danejawa 26.
In addition there were the Sullubawa whom we have already
encountered in Katsina, people of mixed Fulani and Mandingo origin
but otherwise almost indistinguishable from the Fulani proper. In
Kano their main strength lay to the west of the city 27.
The Kano Fulani were in touch with Shehu long before his breach with Yunfa. In fact, at least three prominent members of their leading
families were studying under him at the time of his flight to Gudu.
Soon afterwards they were sent back to Kano
with orders to rally the faithful.
When Shehu's conciliatory letter, written after
his victory at Tabkin Kwatto, was first brought to Alwali, the Chief
of Kano, he was apparently on the point of accepting it but
something caused him to change his mind 28.
We do not know what this was but it may either have been Yunfa's
warning message or else the news that the Fulani, led by Dan Tunku,
had already taken up arms and defeated the attempt of the Chiefs of
Katsina and Daura to join their forces to his. Whatever the reason,
Alwali rejected Shehu's overtures and the war therefore spread to
Kano.
After his early success, Dan Tunku, went north
to Daura, where he helped the Fulani to seize power 29
and he seems to have taken no further part in the jihad in Kano.
This was dominated by seven men drawn from the six territorial
groups which have already been mentioned:
·
Sulimanu of the
Mundubawa, one of Shehu's ablest
and most devoted pupils
·
Muhammadu Dabo of
the Dambazawa, the second of Shehu's
pupils
·
Muhammadu Bakatsine
of the Jobawa, the third of Shehu's pupils
·
Jibirin of the
Yolawa
·
Dan Zabuwa of the
Danejawa
·
Jammo and Ibrahim
Dabo of the Sullubawa.
Under these leaders the Fulani formed a war
camp in the bush at a place called Kwazazzabo `Yar Kwando about
thirty miles west of the city. There they recruited their strength
until they were ready to strike 30.
Their first move, which was probably made in
the dry weather of 1804-5, was to assault the neighbouring town of
Karaye.
This was the headquarters of the Wambai, one of
the territorial magnates of the Hausa hierarchy, and their object
may well have been to forestall an attack by him on their own
unfortified camp. Whatever the purpose, the assault was completely
successful and Karaye, though defended by a wall, was captured 31.
Hitherto Alwali seems to have underrated the
danger which the Fulani represented, but the loss of Karaye stung
him into action. He collected an army and led it against the Fulani
at 'Yar Kwando. According to legend, the battle lasted two days and,
but for a ruse, might have gone against the Fulani. As it was, they
won a heartening victory 32.
The major battle of the jihad in Kano was
fought at Dan Yahaya, about twenty-five miles north of the city, and
probably took place in the dry season of 1806-7. Sarkin Kano Alwali
is said to have put ten thousand horsemen into the field as well as
thousands of infantry. Although this figure may well be an
exaggeration there is no doubt that the Hausas enjoyed a great
preponderance in numbers. Once again, however, the skill and
resolution of the Fulani bowmen turned the tide of war. They won a
crushing victory and forced Alwali and the remnants of his army to
fall back on the city 33.
The withdrawal of the Hausa forces behind the
walls of the capital left the Fulani a free hand in the country.
They put it to good use and soon eliminated, or at any rate
isolated, all pockets of resistance. Having obtained control of the
greater part of the State, they at length turned their attention to
the city. Kano was finally captured in 1807, probably in the last
quarter, that is to say about a year later than Katsina, but a year
earlier than Alkalawa 34.
After losing his capital Alwali fled to Burumburum, a large walled town in the extreme south
of his former domains. Had he been allowed to establish himself
there, he would doubtless have become the focus of a Hausa
resistance movement which might have plagued the new régime for the
rest of the century. As it was, a Fulani force led by Mallam
Jammo of the Sullubawa Clan pursued him and, after a siege of
forty days, stormed the town. Alwali was killed and with his death a
dynasty of forty-three Chiefs
came to an end 35.
Hausa resistance in Kano was thus extinguished.
The choice of the first Fulani Emir and the
division of the spoils of victory among the other leaders was to
cause some dissension. Two years earlier Shehu
had summoned them all to meet him in Zamfara so that he could
appoint a leader, but in the event he had been unable to make the
journey. Bello had therefore represented him at this meeting, which had taken
place just before the attack on Yandoto, and acting on Shehu's
instructions 36
had selected Sulimanu to
take command. The choice was not a happy one because Sulimanu was an
unworldly scholar and evidently lacked the personality that
leadership demanded 37.
So long as the enemy was in the field, the
reformers had suppressed their rivalries and remained loyal to their
appointed leader. As soon as victory was won, however, their
differences broke out. When Abdullahi went to Kano towards the end
of 1807, soon after the capture of the city, he found the Fulani
preoccupied with their worldly rivalries, and at odds with one
another 38.
He had some success in settling their disputes, but with his
departure they seem to have broken out afresh.
At any rate, in 1808 it was considered
necessary to send a deputation to Shehu
in Gwandu in order to get the question of the leadership decided.
Reading between the lines, one cannot escape the conclusion that the
purpose of this move was to have Sulimanu deposed and one of the
other leaders appointed Emir in his place. If this was the case,
however, the attempt failed because Shehu confirmed Bello's earlier choice and invested the
unsophisticated and relatively youthful Sulimanu with the insignia
of an Emir 39.
To consolidate his authority still further he also gave him a
daughter in marriage.
Despite these marks of favour Sulimanu never
succeeded in quelling the rivalries that surrounded him or
establishing himself firmly on the throne of Kano. In fact, within a
year he had a serious quarrel with one of his lieutenants, Muhammadu
Dabo, which again required Shehu's
intervention 40.
The persistence of these jealousies helps to
explain why in 1809 the
Kano Fulani, unlike their cousins in Katsina and Zamfara, sent no
reinforcements to Shehu for the final battle at Alkalawa. The truth is that because of
Sulimanu's weakness as a ruler the hold which they had established
on Kano, was at first a precarious one. This was revealed by the
widespread Hausa revolts which broke out when Sulimanu died in 1819.
In most of the Fulani Emirates when the first
ruler died the succession passed to his descendants. That events in
Kano took a different course can be attributed to two factors,
first, the near-equality of the seven families which had led the
jihad and, second, the ineffectiveness of Sulimanu as a ruler. When
he died the question of who should succeed him was referred to
Sokoto. By that time Shehu
too was dead and Bello
had become Sultan. His choice fell on Ibrahim
Dabo, the head of the Sullubawa, who was duly appointed to be
the second Emir and who founded the dynasty which was to rule Kano
for the rest of the century 41.
Zazzau
was the most southerly of the original Hausa States. Between it
and the River Benue lay a belt of country which differed from the
open plains of the north by being more hilly and having a denser
cover of bush. This area contained no important States, apart from
Nupe in the south-west, and its population was grouped into a number
of petty principalities and independent pagan tribes. In the
seventeenth century they were all embodied into the riverain empire
of Kwararafa, while Zazzau itself was threatened and constricted,
but as the Jukun power receded again, so a power-vacuum was created
into which Zazzau was able to expand.
In the north the expansion of the Hausa States
had already taken the form of settlement; plantation, or conquest
followed by assimilation. In the south, however, the denser bush did
not appeal to Hausa settlers and the more primitive tribes were not
easy to assimilate. Consequently, Zazzau's expansion proceeded by
conquest and the imposition of suzerainty, not by settlement or
assimilation, and the pattern which emerged from it differed from
the conventional one. By the end of the eighteenth century there
were, in fact, five petty Chiefs on Zazzau's southern borders who
ruled over congeries of Gwaris, Bassas, and other small tribes and
tribal fragments. All these Chiefs owed allegiance to Zazzau and
were subject to loose control by the Hausa Chief. Provided that they
paid their tribute of slaves, however, they were largely left to
their own
devices 42.
In addition to these vassals, there were other
tribes which had never made submission. Having refused to purchase
their immunity by doing homage and paying tribute, they were
regarded by the Hausas as fair game for the slave raids by which
Zazzau traditionally supported itself and provided for the needs of
the rest of Hausaland 43.
In 1802 Muhamman
Makau succeeded as the sixtieth Chief of Zazzau 44. He was a devout Moslem and when,
after the jihad had begun, Shehu's message was brought to him, he
was ready to accept it. His advisers thought otherwise, however, and
he was compelled to defer to their views 45.
As Zazzau had apparently not followed Gobir and Katsina in
renouncing its allegiance to Bornu, and as the suzerain's influence
seems to have been stronger there than in the other Hausa States 46,
it may well be that Makau was coerced in this matter by the Kachalla,
the Sultan of Bornu's Resident at his Court, or perhaps by
an alliance between the Kachalla and his own
Councillors, Whatever the process might have been, the outcome was
that Shehu's overtures were rejected and the war spread.
The principal leader of the jihad in Zazzau was
a Fulani called Mallam Musa
who hailed originally from Mali,
in the western Sudan, He had come to Hausaland some time before and,
after studying under Shehu,
had established himself in Zazzau as a religious teacher. He is said
to have taken part in the flight from Degel to Gudu and he certainly
received a flag from Shehu with a commission to lead the jihad in
Zazzau 47.
The Fulani had been established for generations
in Zazzau, as in the other Hausa States, and Musa's appointment as
leader seems to have caused some jealousy among the older families.
Prominent among these were another branch of the Sullubawa, whom we
have already met in Katsina and Kano, and the Bornawa who, as their
name shows, were Fulani who had come to Zazzau by way of Bornu. Musa
was instructed by Shehu to work with their leaders, Abdu
Salami and Yamusa, and this he did 48.
In the month of March, probably in the year
1805, Musa entered Zazzau
from the north 49.
No doubt he had previously arranged a rendezvous there with Shehu's known adherents. In addition he received support from some
of the local Hausas 50.
As soon as he heard of the invasion, Malum sent his cavalry, under the Madaki, to intercept the enemy and
bar their way to the city.
Musa either defeated this force or else gave it
the slip, for very soon afterwards he was able to take the Hausas
completely by surprise. It happened to be the day of the Lesser
Bairam, festival and the Chief, attended by his followers and
accompanied by all the Moslems of the city, had ridden forth as
usual to the ceremonial prayer-ground outside the walls.
While there, they were surprised by Musa's
cavalry and their retreat into the city cut off. Being unarmed they
were unable to stand and fight and so they had no choice but to fly.
The great city of Zaria, therefore, fell to the Fulani with hardly a
blow having been struck 51.
Having lost his capital Makau
made his way south with about three thousand followers. He went
first to Kauru, but the Chief, who was one of his vassals, shut the
gates of the town against him. He therefore passed on to Kajuru
where the Chief admitted him. The Fulani were close on his heels,
however, and besieged him there for six months. In the end their
pressure became so great that he was forced to move on again 52
From Kajuru, Makau
went on to Zuba. The Fulani continued to attack and harry him
for the next fifteen months, but in the south the terrain was more
hilly and less open than in the north and they failed to kill or
capture him. Finally, in 1807, he repulsed them whereupon they
abandoned the pursuit and went back to Zaria 53.
When he became a fugitive, Makau found that some of his subjects, notably the Gwari, remained
loyal to him but that most of them threw off their allegiance.
Having no capital or base of his own, he was forced to keep moving
about in the broken country which lies between the Niger and the
Benue Rivers near their confluence. In this way he preserved a
precarious existence for another eighteen years, In 1825, however,
while attacking the town of Lapai, he met his death 54.
Makau
was succeeded by his brother, Abu
Ja. It was he who founded the town of Abuja and this became the
headquarters of the fugitive Hausas of Zazzau 55.
They continued to maintain their independence and, by exerting their
influence over the neighbouring pagan tribes, gradually built Abuja
into a Chiefdom of some importance. For the rest of the century they
were to remain a thorn in the side of the Fulani, but they never
developed into such a serious menace as the diehards of Gobir,
Katsina, and Kebbi were soon to become.
Meanwhile, Mallam
Musa had been confirmed by Shehu
as the first Fulani Emir. His first task was to consolidate his
authority in Zazzau proper and its vassal States. After the flight
of Makau there seems to have been little resistance from the Hausas 56. The feudatories and major office
holders fled or stepped down into obscurity. Either way, the road
was left open for the new Emir to install his own supporters, the
great majority of whom were Fulani.
Musa
was not content with consolidation, however, and was determined to
extend his dominions southward. This he did by inducing the Fulani
in the area, who were already fighting the local pagan tribes, to
accept his leadership. The Fulani of Jema'a seem to have been glad
enough to do so in return for Musa's promise of protection and
support 57.
Those of Keffi, where Abdu
Zanga had already established a town protected by a stockade,
were at first hopeful of obtaining recognition direct from Shehu,
but Musa persuaded them that Shehu had already made him suzerain of
all the territory between Zaria and the Benue River. In the end,
therefore, they were content to accept a flag from him and
acknowledge him as their overlord 58.
In this way the two small Emirates of Jema'a
and Keffi came into being in about 1810
as vassals of Zazzau. Nearly a generation later the process was
repeated when Makama Dogo, a Hausa soldier of fortune who had carved
out a kingdom for himself in the south, was recognized as the vassal
Emir of Nassarawa 59. In this way Zaria, as the Emirate
of the Fulani now came to be called, at length reached the Benue.
When Musa, the first Emir, died in 1821 one of his sons expected to succeed him. In the event, however,
the choice of the Electors fell on Yamusa, the head of the Bornawa
family, who as the Madaki had been Musa's principal lieutenant.
Similarly, when Yamusa died in 1834, the throne did not go to any of
his sons but to Abdul Kerim, another Fulani who had played a
prominent part in the jihad 60.
After that, apart from one aberration, the succession rotated
irregularly between the houses of these first three Emirs. This
meant that Zaria had three ruling families whereas in all the other
Emirates, including Kano after the initial change, there was only
one dynasty.
Notes
1. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 105).
2. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 63).
3. Ibid. p. 66.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p. 77.
6. Ibid. p. 8.
7. Ibid. p. 87.
8. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, P. 87).
9. Sokoto DNBs, History of Gusau.
10. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 87). The place is
deserted now, but the site, still marked by baobab trees, can be
seen on the Zaria-Gusau road. See also Note 11 in
Appendix I.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. p. 78
13. Sokoto DNBs, History of Gusau.
14. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 78).
15. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, up. cit. p. 168.
16. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 78).
17. Daniel, op. cit. p. 16.
18. Bello, Inf M (Arnett p. 78).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. pp. 78-79.
22. Daniel, op. cit. p. 16.
23. To mark their greater devotion to Islam,
the title ‘Emir’ has been reserved in this book for the Fulani
rulers while their Hausa predecessors, though nominally
Moslem, have been described as ‘Chiefs’.
24. Daniel, op. cit. pp. 16-17.
25. M. Abadie, La Colonie du Niger, Paris,
1927, pp. 124 and 380.
26. Alhaji Abubakar, Kano to Dabo Cigari, Kano,
1959, pp. 48-49.
27. Gazetteer of Kano Province, p. 11.
28. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 63).
29. Ibid. p. 79.
30. Alhaji Abubakar, op. cit. p. 49, and Kano
DNBs, History of Kiru.
31. Kano, DNBs, History of Karaye.
32. Kano DNBs, History of Kano.
33. Gazetteer of Kano Province, p. 11, and
Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 79).
34. Kano had certainly, but apparently only
recently, been taken when Abdullahi reached it in October or
November 1807. See Note to in Appendix 1.
35. Kano DNBs, History of Tudun Wada. The
visitor to Burumburum is still shown the baobab tree under which
Alwali lies buried.
36. Information from Alhaji Junaidu.
37. H. A. S. Johnston, A Selection of Hausa
Stories, Oxford, 1966, pp. 121-2.
38. Abdullah, TW (Hiskett, p. 121).
39. Alhaji Abubakar, op. cit. p. 49.
40. Kano DNBs, History of Dambarta.
41. Alhaji Abubakar, op cit. pp. 52-53. For
Ibrahim Dabo's family tree see Table 4 in Appendix II.
42. Ch A, p. 6.
43. Ibid. p. 4.
44. Ch A, p. 37.
45. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 64). Confirmed by
Alhaji Junaidu.
46. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, op. cit. p. 219.
47. M. G. Smith, op. cit. p. 138.
48. Ibid. pp. 138-9.
49. Ch A, p. 5. The date given there is 1804,
but this cannot be right because we know from Bello that it was not
until July 1804 that Shehu wrote his letters to the
Hausa Chiefs, including Zazzau, and the jihad
did not really spread to the other States until his overtures had
been rejected.
50. M. G. Smith, op. cit. p. 139.
51. Ch A, pp. 5-6. This disaster is still
commemorated during the Moslem festivals in Abuja by the Emir's
bodyguard facing to the west while he turns to the east to pray.
52. Ibid. p. 7.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid. p. 8.
55. Ibid. p. 9.
56. M. G. Smith, op. cit. p. 140.
57. Notes on Nassarawa Province, 1920, p. 13.
58. Ibid. p. 6.
59. Ibid. pp. 16-17.
60. M. G. Smith, op. cit. pp. 150-2.
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