Despite the fact that Goldie's gamble in attacking
Nupe and florin had apparently been a complete success, opinion in
London was hardening against him. It was at last beginning to be
realized that a commercial company, whose first duty was to make
profits for its shareholders, was not a suitable instrument for the
execution of imperial policy, and that in any case the Royal Niger
Company simply did not possess the resources in men and materials to
occupy a territory of hundreds of thousands of square miles and
administer a population of many millions. Furthermore Goldie, who
was self-willed and secretive, was coming to be regarded by
politicians and civil servants alike with growing distrust.
With the Tories back in power the British Government's attitude
to imperial responsibilities had in any case undergone a marked
change. Its policy was no longer the purely negative one of keeping
the French and Germans out of British spheres of influence with the
least possible expense to the Exchequer. Now, with Chamberlain at
the Colonial Office, there was a new drive towards the effective
occupation of British Protectorates as a necessary preliminary to
the suppression of abuses like slave-raiding and the development of
potential wealth.
The days of the Royal Niger Company were therefore numbered. In
1897 the British Government, tired of having to rely on the
Company's Constabulary to withstand the heavy pressure of the French
in the Borgu area, decided to create the West African Frontier
Force. In the following year they went further and made up their
minds to revoke the Company's Charter and assume direct
responsibility for the whole of the Niger Territories. These
decisions were duly put into effect and on 1 January 1900 the
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was brought into being. Sir
Frederick Lugard, who had previously been Commandant of the Frontier
Force, was appointed to the new post of High Commissioner.
On the surface Lugard appeared to be a typical product of his
class and age, but in fact he was a most unusual man. He had been
educated at a public school and then, after passing through
Sandhurst, had gone into the army. Having spent his childhood in
India, he had returned there as a young soldier and had fought in
three frontier campaigns. Until he was thirty, in fact, his career
had been completely conventional. At that point, however, a
tempestuous love affair with a married woman had driven him oft this
safe course and, after carrying him dangerously close to the shores
of insanity, had cast him up, an emotional wreck, on the shores of
Africa 1. There his first service had
been in Nyasaland and Uganda. Then in 1894 he had been brought to
West Africa to lead the Nikki Expedition and three years later had
been appointed Commissioner and Commandant of the West African
Frontier Force.
When Lugard became High Commissioner he was still only forty-two.
For the past twelve years he had been trying to obliterate his
unhappy memories by hard work and alleviate his earlier frustration
through new achievements. At this period, therefore, he was a
dynamic and ambitious man and a hard-driving and often ungracious
master. Nevertheless, even when he was trying to exorcize his own
private devils, he believed passionately in the importance of what
he was doing and, at any rate in his lonely dedication to duty, was
a man of the same stamp as Livingstone and Gordon.
The territory which Lugard took over in 1900 was a Protectorate
only in name. Except in the neighbourhood of the two great rivers,
there was no effective occupation or control. And even there Nupe
had reasserted its independence when the Emir Abubakr had returned
to his capital and ousted Goldie's nominee, while in llorin the Emir
had resumed his attacks on the Yorubas and was disregarding all
protests. In the north-west, Sultan Abdu had never asked for
protection and had now become so hostile that he could not be
expected either to submit or negotiate. In the north-east, Rabeh was
equally determined to resist any further extension of European
power.
A few months after the new Protectorate had been declared, war
broke out in Ashanti. At this Lugard had to agree to half the
Frontier Force, which now numbered about 2,500, being sent to the
Gold Coast as reinforcements. Their absence not only compelled him
to hold up the plans that he was maturing but also encouraged the
Emirs of Nupe and Kontagora to resume slave-raiding in Kabba and
Gwari. Although, as we shall see, there was urgent need for British
intervention in Bornu, the audacity that the two Emirs were now
showing convinced Lugard that his first action must be against them 2.
As soon as the troops returned from Ashanti, therefore, Lugard
gave orders for an expedition to be prepared against Bida and
Kontagora. Before taking this drastic step he made no attempt to get
in touch with the Sultan or the Emir of Gwandu to find out whether
they, as the suzerains, were willing or able to restrain their
turbulent vassals. For this omission he is open to exactly the same
criticism as Goldie in 1896-7.
In Kontagora the first Emir, Umaru Nagwamatse, had died in
1876 and been succeeded first by his eldest son and then, when he in
turn had died in 1880 by another son called Ibrahim 3.
This Ibrahim, a chip off the old block, had pursued the same policy
as his father, continually harrying the pagans, particularly the
Gwaris, and always looking for excuses to encroach upon the
territory of his neighbour
In the 'eighties, when Umaru of the Bello House had been Sultan,
Ibrahim had had to keep his depredations within bounds, but when his
uncle Abdu had succeeded in Sokoto, he seems to have thrown off all
restraint. He now divided his time between his capital, Kontagora,
and the military camp which he had established on the Kano-Bida
trade route. From this base he levied tribute on passing caravans
and undertook slave-raids whenever it pleased him to do so. One of
his major successes was the sack of Birnin Gwari and by 1894 he had
already devastated the country for miles around and so disrupted and
depopulated it that even food was unobtainable 4.
« In the course of our march from Kano to Bida, wrote a
European traveller, we passed towns and villages, literally without
number, which had been recently destroyed and their inhabitants sold
as slaves 5. »
This description shows that under Abdu's
disastrous rule parts of the Empire were sliding towards anarchy and
it perhaps helps to explain why Lugard did not trouble to seek his
help before taking military action.
Early in 1901 a column of the West African
Frontier Force moved against Kontagora. Ibrahim barred its passage
in front of his capital, but he was easily defeated and forced to
flee. After his flight Lugard wrote to the Sultan to explain the
action he had seen fit to take and to invite the Sultan to nominate
a successor. But to this letter he received no reply.
From Kontagora the column marched on to Bida.
The Emir Abubakr, Goldie's old adversary, offered no resistance but
fled when the British approached. The town was therefore occupied
with very little fighting. Without waiting to consult Sokoto or
Gwandu about the succession, Lugard restored the Emir Muhammadu to
the throne on which Goldie had placed him four years earlier. At the
same time he presented him with a letter of appointment setting out
the conditions on which he held his office.
When Lugard returned to his capital at Lokoja
he left British Residents behind in both Bida and Kontagora, which
thus became the headquarters of two new Provinces in the
Protectorate. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they had
ceased to he parts of the Fulani Empire.
Although the problems of Bornu still demanded
urgent attention, Lugard now began to think that he must settle
accounts with Adamawa before sending an expedition to Chad. In this
he was influenced by the fact that river transport provided easily
the best means of reaching Yola and that September was the only time
of the year when the larger steamers could operate so far up-stream.
Consequently, if he did not catch the flood of 1901 it would mean
waiting another year.
Relations between the British and the Fulani of
Adamawa had never been good. As early as 1885 a wooden hulk had been
towed up to Yola to serve as a base for the Company's operations,
but in the face of opposition from Sanda, who was then Emir, the
venture had withered and been abandoned. In 1890 Sanda had died and
been succeeded by Zubeiru, who had soon allowed the trading-hulk to
return to Yola. Moreover, in 1893 he had entered into a treaty with
the Company, agreeing to accept a subsidy, and four years later this
agreement had been reaffirmed and slightly amplified 6.
In spite of these treaties, however, relations
between the Company and the Fulani had not improved. To some extent
they had been wilfully damaged by the intrigues of the French
adventurer Mizon, but the main cause of the trouble had lain in the
character of Zubeiru himself who, though a man of great courage and
considerable ability, was proud, suspicious, and bigoted 7.
In 1897, soon after renewing the treaty with
the Company, Zubeiru had received letters from the Sultan calling on
him to expel the Company's agents from Adamawa as a reprisal for the
attacks on Bida and Ilorin 8.
Although he had not complied with the order at the time, Zubeiru had
afterwards become more suspicious and intolerant than ever. Faced by
this intransigence, and fortified in his resolve by reports about
Zubeiru's raids against his pagan neighbours and his continued
dealings in slaves, Lugard came to the conclusion that he must
settle accounts with Adamawa without further delay. In reaching this
decision he was no doubt influenced by the thought that a hostile
and unsubdued Adamawa would constitute a serious threat to the long
lines of communications of any expeditions which might be sent
against Bornu.
The Yola Expedition was fitted out in the rainy
season of 1901 Wallace of the Niger Company, who had become Lugard's
Deputy, sailed with it to take charge of political negotiations. The
steamers reached Yola in early September and, as Zubeiru refused to
parley, the troops were put ashore. They occupied the town without
much difficulty, but were challenged in front of the Emir's palace.
This was protected by a high wall and was defended by Zubeiru's
personal bodyguard, who were reinforced by sixty veterans of Rabeh's
army and supported by the two cannon which Mizon had presented to
the Emir some years before 9. After a
stiff fight, in which the British forces suffered about 40
casualties and the Fulani 150, the palace was taken by storm 10.
When Yola fell Zubeiru succeeded in making his
escape and fled across the border to Marua in the German Cameroons.
On his way there he wrote this letter to the Sultan.
I write to tell you of the terrible disaster which has
befallen us. The Christians have made war on us. We were warned but
paid no heed ... and now we have been brought down by them. They
have seized Yola but have not occupied the districts. Nor have they
taken me because I made good my escape. I am now three days march
from Yola, seeking a dry place in which to rest until the rains
cease....
I shall not stoop to double-dealing between you and the Christians.
By God and the Prophet, my allegiance is to you.... Even if all my
towns are taken from me I shall never submit to the Unbelievers. The
Prophet declared that he who dwelt with the Unbeliever should be
numbered among them... Peace be on him who adheres to the faith. 11
At about the same time Zubeiru sent the
following message to the people of Yola and two other towns.
I shall return and we shall drive out the Unbelievers.
But if they prove too strong for us you must leave Yola and follow
me to a new country. The Koran forbids you to consort with
Unbelievers.... They wish to take our country. Have no dealings with
them 12.
These letters show the stern, uncompromising
stuff that Zubeiru was made of. The exhortation to abandon house and
home rather than submit to Christian domination is particularly
interesting and we shall encounter it again. Among the bulk of the
people of Adamawa, however, it evoked no response.
Even so, Zubeiru was not yet finished. Across
the border he roused the Fulani to an attack on the German force
which had occupied Garua. They were heavily defeated, however, and
soon afterwards the Germans launched a counterattack on Zubeiru's
followers in Marua. There the Fulani showed that the fanatical
courage they had displayed in the jihad was not by any means dead.
Though opposed by machine guns, some 400 of Zubeiru's Sikirri, who
had vowed to conquer or die, fought to the last man round his
standard 13.
After this disaster Zubeiru, who had again evaded capture, managed
to preserve his liberty for another year in the hilly country along
the border between Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons. In the end,
however, early in 1903, he succumbed to the poisoned arrows of the
pagans whom he had so long harried 14.
Meanwhile, in Yola the British had installed
Zubeiru's younger brother, Bobbo Ahmadu, as the new Emir. At the
same time Adamawa had been proclaimed a Province in the Protectorate
and a Resident had been appointed to take charge of it. One more
Emirate had thus been lost to the Empire.
While these events were taking place along the
Niger and Benue Rivers, there had been important developments in the
Chad region.
Just before the end of the century the French,
in pursuit of a grand design to stake out claims to the whole of the
interior of West Africa, had launched three separate expeditions
from North Africa, the Congo, and Senegal with orders to march on
Lake Chad and join forces there. Early in 1900 these three columns
had duly made their rendezvous. Soon afterwards they had brought
Rabeh to battle at Kusseri, on the River Logone, and won a crushing
victory in which Rabeh had been killed 15.
When Rabeh had marched out to meet the French
he had left his son, Fadr Allah, in charge of Dikwa with Hayatu as
his second-in-command. By this time Hayatu had lost faith in Rabeh
and he now planned to desert, but his wife, Hauwa, betrayed the plot
to her brother, Fadr Allah. When Hayatu and his followers slipped
away, therefore, they were pursued and overtaken by Fadr Allah with
a superior force of cavalry. In the battle that followed Hayatu was
soon killed. Once again, however, the Fulani displayed their courage
and devotion, for they refused to abandon the body of their leader
and one hundred of them, fought round him and perished to the last
man 16.
As for Fadr Allah, when Rabeh was defeated and
killed at Kusseri, he abandoned Dikwa and led the garrison and the
remnants of the army westward into Bornu. As he was now in the
British sphere of influence, the French were precluded from
following him. Nevertheless, to be on the safe side, he sent a
message to Lugard asking to be taken under British protection.
These events put Lugard in a dilemma. He was
loath to recognize a man who had so recently been at war with
another European nation, but he was not sure whether there was
anyone else capable of ruling Bornu. Moreover, he was afraid that if
the whole region dissolved into chaos, as it might easily do, the
French would use the danger of anarchy as an excuse for stepping in
and occupying Bornu themselves 17.
But Lugard, as we have seen, could not move into Bornu in 1900,
because half the troops were in Ashanti, nor yet in 1901 because of
the necessity of securing his base and southern flank by first
subduing Kontagora, Nupe, and Adamawa. During the interval Fadr
Allah, after recruiting his strength, began to raid and harry the
French across the border. This provoked them into retaliation and,
late in 1901, a French column pursued him into British territory and
killed him at Gujba.
The French intervention made the effective
occupation of Bornu absolutely imperative. A strong force had
already been assembled at Ibi, on the Benue, in anticipation of this
need, and early in 1902 Lugard dispatched it to Chad with orders to
march through Bauchi and deal with that Emirate on the way.
In Bauchi the Emir Umaru had planned to fight,
but when he saw the strength of the British column his discretion
overcame his valour and he took to flight. Wallace, who was
representing Lugard, thereupon consulted the Electors and, on their
advice, appointed Umaru's cousin Muhammadu to succeed him 18.
But once again there was no consultation with the Sultan either
about the deposition of one Emir or the appointment of the other.
After leaving Bauchi, Wallace's column crossed
the Upper Gongola and entered what had previously been the northern
part of Gombe Emirate but was now the independent territory of
Mallam Jibrilla. Near Tongo it was almost ambushed by Jibrilla's
force, which consisted of 100 horse and about 600 foot, but the
attack was beaten off and the enemy routed. In the ensuing pursuit
Jibrilla, now an elderly man, was captured and sent down to Lokoja 19.
The Emir of Gombe, Umaru, who had already made
submission to the British and who was in fact riding with the column
20, was then formally recognized as
the ruler of the Emirate and had his lost domains, including the
town of Burmi, restored to him. Because Jibrilla had been captured,
it was mistakenly assumed that Burmi was no longer a danger and so
no further action was taken against its inhabitants. This was an
omission that the British were soon to regret.
Having dealt with Jibrilla and settled Gombe,
the column marched on into Bornu. After nearly ten years of war the
Kanuri people were so impoverished and exhausted that they welcomed
the prospect of security and peace which the British brought with
them. Bukar Garbai, a great-grandson of El-Kanemi, was formally
installed and accepted the conditions of his appointment without
demur. Because of the accidents of history, therefore, the ancient
kingdom of Bornu, which in other circumstances might have been
expected to resist European domination as vigorously as Sokoto, now
submitted itself willingly to the yoke.
It was to be expected that the Emirs who had been ousted by the
British would sooner or later make their way to Sokoto. Zubeiru of
Adamawa would probably have done so if he had not been killed, but
Nupe and Bauchi seem to have taken refuge in Kano 21
and to have made no effort to go any farther. This was bad enough,
but Kontagora's conduct was positively disruptive.
After the loss of his Emirate, Sarkin Sudan Ibrahim established
himself near Fatika in Zaria Emirate. It happened that at that time
the Emir of Zaria, Kwasau, was not only on bad terms with the
Sultan, who had not favoured his election in the first place 22,
but was also at feud with Sarkin Zamfara Umaru dan Mamudu, the ruler
of the great fief of Zurmi in eastern Sokoto. Now this Umaru was an
old ally of Sarkin Sudan's in expeditions against the Gwari 23
and so Sarkin Sudan took his side against the Emir of Zaria, or at
any rate used his ally's feud as a licence for indiscriminate
attacks on Zaria's neighbouring towns and villages. The result was
that in the latter part of 1901 a minor civil war developed in Zaria
Emirate between the forces of the Emir on one side and those of
Sarkin Sudan and Sarkin Zamfara on the other. The Emir succeeded in
shifting Sarkin Sudan from Fatika to Kaya but failed to drive him
out altogether 24. In the meantime
his people were suffering so severely that early in 1902 he
determined to call for help.
In Sokoto, Abdu was now in his seventy-third year and nearing the
end of his life. Senility seems to have overtaken him because, while
his Empire was disintegrating around him, he sat in his capital and
concerned himself chiefly in keeping out local traders, particularly
Yorubas, whom he imagined to be agents sent by the British to spy
out the land 25. Apart from some
rather ineffective remonstrances, however, he had done nothing to
restrain his nephew Ibrahim and Umaru dan Mamudu from ravaging
northern Zaria. It was therefore natural for the Emir of Zaria to
conclude that there was no help to be had from him. Instead he
appealed to Lugard who, having moved his headquarters from Lokoja to
Jebba and then from Jebba to Zungeru, was by this time in a much
better position than before to help him.
Early in 1902, in response to this appeal, Lugard sent a company
of Mounted Infantry against Sarkin Sudan. They advanced so rapidly
that they took him completely by surprise. Although he was
surrounded by his own people in his war-camp, he offered little
resistance and was hauled off into captivity. At the same time a
garrison was established near Zaria city and a Resident was
appointed to take charge of this new Province of the Protectorate.
For Sokoto and Gwandu the past twelve months had brought one
disaster after another, each more damaging than the last. First
Kontagora and Nupe had been vanquished and their Emirs driven into
exile. Next Adamawa had been occupied and the Lamido had become a
hunted fugitive. After that Bauchi had capitulated without a
struggle and had supinely accepted the new Emir appointed by the
High Commissioner. Then, worse still, the Emir of Gombe had allied
himself to the British and accepted at their hands the restoration
of the lost provinces which, in the previous decade, his rightful
suzerains had made no effort to recover for him. And finally, worst
of all, the Emir of Zaria had ignored the Sultan and voluntarily
delivered up his Emirate to the occupation of the British.
When Lugard had sent a message to Sokoto after the capture of
Kontagora and the occupation of Bida, Abdu had not deigned to
answer. But in May 1902, moved no doubt by the series of disasters
for which he considered the British responsible, he at last brought
himself to reply 26. Unlike his other
acts of intransigence had a certain defiant grandeur:
From us to you. Know that I do not consent to any of your
people dwelling among us. I myself shall never be reconciled to you,
nor shall I permit any further dealings with you. Henceforth there
shall be no exchanges between us save those between Moslems and
Unbelievers-Holy War as the Almighty has enjoined on us. There is
neither authority nor power save in God on high 27.
Notes
1. Margery Perham, Lugard: The Years of Adventure, London, 1956, pp.
59-73.
2. Annual Reports, Northern Nigeria, 1900-11, p. 11.
3. Gazetteer of Kontagora Province, p. 11. Ibrahim is often referred
to as Nagwamatse, but this is incorrect as the nickname was his
father's, not his.
4. Robinson, op. cit. pp. 232-42.
5. Ibid. p. 131.
6. Kirk-Greene, op. cit. p. 49.
7. Gazetteer of Yola Province, pp. 20-22.
8. Kirk-Greene, op. cit, p. 49.
9. Gazetteer of Yola Province, pp. 21-22.
10. Kirk-Greene, op. cit. pp. 57-58.
11. Backwell, op. cit. cf. Letter, no. 112.
12. Cf. Kirk-Greene, op. cit. p. 59.
13. Gazetteer of Yola Province, p. 22
14. Ibid.
15. Gentil, op. cit.
16. Alexander, op. cit. pp. 203-4.
17. Annual Reports, Northern Nigeria, 1900-11, pp. 63-68.
18. Gazetteer of Bauchi Province, pp. 11-12.
19. Annual Reports, Northern Nigeria, 1900-11, pp. 65-66.
20. Gazetteer of Bauchi Province, p. 14.
21. Confirmed by Alhaji Junaidu.
22. M. G. Smith, op. cit. pp. 193-4.
23. Gazetteer of Kontagora Province, p. 11. Confirmed by Alhaji
Junaidu.
24. Edges, op. cit. vol. I, pp. 191-4.
25. Ibid. vol. II, part II, no. 15.
26. Annual Reports, Northern Nigeria, 1900-11, pp. 82 and 159.
27. As the original of this letter has not been preserved, its
authenticity has been called in question. See D. J. M. Muffett,
Concerning Brave Captains, London, 1964, pp. 42-51. This possibility
and Lugard's dealings with Sultan Abdu and his successor are
examined more closely in Appendix III.
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