The Fulani Empire of Sokoto

Sultan Abdu

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It will be remembered that, when Ahmadu Rufa'i had become Sultan in 1867, his choice had broken the tradition that appointments should alternate between the House of Bello and the House of Atiku. On his death in 1873 the succession had gone back to the House of Bello with the election of Abubakr na Rabah. When he in turn had died in 1877 the House of Atiku had again been passed over and he had been succeeded by his younger brother Mu'azu. Then, when Mu'azu had died in 1881, the claims of the Atikawa had again been ignored and the choice had fallen on Bello's senior grandson, Umaru.
During most of this period the leading contender from the House of Atiku, whose hopes had been so frequently blighted, had been Abdur Rahman. Abdu, as he was generally called, was a son of Sultan Atiku and a younger brother of Sultan Ahmadu Zaruku. He was also the elder brother of Umaru Nagwamatse of Kontagora, but this connexion was more of a handicap than an advantage and only served to heighten the suspicion, which already existed, that he had similar flaws in his character 1.
Though belonging to an earlier generation, Abdu was younger than Sultan Umaru 2 and outlived him. In 1891, when Umaru died, he was, in fact, in his early sixties. His maturity probably helped him, because during the second half of the century the Electoral College seemed to be inclining more and more to the simple principle of seniority. In considering their decision this time they no doubt also took into consideration the fact that the House of Bello had provided the last three Sultans and that it was twenty-five years since the House of Atiku had had its last turn. Ignoring the portents, therefore, they chose Abdu to succeed. At any period their choice would have been a bad one. At this particular point, however, when the Empire was for the first time being drawn into the main current of world events, it was to prove absolutely calamitous.
Abdu's reign began inauspiciously. On his accession he found a dispute going on between two of his principal vassals over the little town of Birnin Tudu. He handled it so ineptly that one of them, the Chief of Talata Mafara, went into open revolt. Talata Mafara was one of the larger fragments of the old Zamfara kingdom and its defection caused risings in some of the other Zamfara towns, notably Anka 3.
The rebellion was not a very formidable one and had Abdu moved with speed and decision he could quickly have stamped it out. As it was, however, he gave the rebels time to take the initiative. This they did by summoning the Gobir and Katsina diehards to their aid and sacking the loyal town of Tureta, which lay about half-way between Talata Mafara and Sokoto 4.
After this disaster, which was all the more humiliating because many of the women and children of Tureta were carried off into slavery 5, Abdu bestirred himself, drove the diehards back beyond the frontiers of the Empire, and brought the rebels to heel. The indemnity of 1,000 slaves that he imposed on them gave warning of the cupidity and vindictiveness for which he was later to become notorious 6.
By the time Abdu succeeded as Sultan the war with Kebbi had already begun to go against the Fulani. Sama'ila was now at the height of his powers and by his genius for guerrilla fighting was inflicting one painful reverse after another on Sokoto and Gwandu. Abdu, for all his other faults, was not wanting in vision or resolution. He seems to have realized at once that the defensive strategy on which the Fulani had fallen back left the initiative with the Kebbawa and that to end the war it would be necessary to bring them to a decisive battle. He therefore resolved at all costs to capture Argungu, which was not only their capital but the sally-port for most of their raids, and made a vow that he would not shave his head until he had done so 7.
The last two Fulani expeditions against Argungu had both been failures. Abdu did not repeat the earlier mistake of underrating the enemy but, having decided to mount an offensive, he sent out a summons to all his Emirs ordering them to bring half their total forces to Sokoto for an expedition against Kebbi. The strategy was unquestionably sound but, unfortunately for the Fulani, Abdu possessed none of the qualities of leadership that were needed to see it through.
Although he had been Sultan for only a short time he had already acquired a reputation of being a tyrant. When his summons reached the Emirs, therefore, they only obeyed it with reluctance. Their unspoken thoughts were that it would be a mistake to rid such a man of his external enemies, for then he would be free to do as he pleased within the Empire. For this reason many of those who joined the expedition were secretly hoping that it would fail 8.
The Fulani army mustered slowly in the dry weather of 1892-3. The Emirs of Katsina and Bauchi came in person with their troops while the Emir of Kano and the Lamido of Adamawa were represented by their sons. The Zaria contingent was commanded by the Madaki 9. It was late in the season when, with Abdu at their head, they finally got on the move. Such a mighty host were they that, according to tradition, they drank all the wells dry and raised a dust that hung over them like a cloud.
In Argungu, Sama'ila had long had wind of their coming. He had therefore had time to strengthen the defences of the town and summon to his aid his faithful Arewa and Zaberma vassals. Though he must have realized that the crisis of his career was approaching, he showed no dismay when told that Abdu had set off from Sokoto but simply said:
— Let him come; I'm waiting for him 10
As Abdu approached Argungu he was joined by the Gwandu contingent. Together they improvised a fortified camp for the noncombatants and baggage and made their final preparations for the impending struggle. Because the weight of numbers was so overwhelmingly in their favour they assumed that Sama'ila would not risk a pitched battle but would shut himself up in the town as all his predecessors had done. This assumption, and the overconfidence that lay behind it, was to prove a fatal blunder. When Abdu ordered the advance on the following day he neglected to have a proper reconnaissance made and took it for granted that all the enemy's forces were in the town. Consequently, when his army reached Argungu, he did not scent any danger but allowed the troops to disperse round the walls so that each contingent could take up the siege station to which it had already been assigned.
On the other side Sama'ila had three possible courses open to him. He could either retire with all his men behind the walls of Argungu in the hope of being able to withstand a siege, or he could bar the
Sultan's way with all his forces and risk everything on the result of a single pitched battle, or again he could divide his forces and leave his foot in Argungu while keeping his horse outside as an independent striking force. Given the Sultan's great numerical superiority the first alternative was the safest and the third the most hazardous. Sama'ila, who was highly superstitious, first consulted his augurs and then chose the third 11.
Having taken this decision he sent all his cavalry out of the town before the Fulani came on the scene and ordered them to conceal themselves in the bush beyond the cultivated area. At the last possible moment he too slipped out and put himself at their head. From this vantage point the Kebbawa watched the Fulani army arrive and flow round the walls like an advancing tide until they had completely encircled the town. When he saw them thus dispersed and off their guard to the real danger, which lay behind them, Sama'ila knew that his garrible had succeeded.
— The Lord be praised, he cried. I Sama'ila give thanks to God and His Prophet.
At this his famous bay charger, which was believed by the superstitious to be no horse but a jinn or familiar spirit, is said to have whinnied three times and so convinced every man that victory was assured 12.
When he judged the moment to be right Sama'ila led his cavalry out of the bush and fell like a thunderbolt on the rear of the Fulani army, whose attention was focused on the town. The sector where he first struck was occupied by the Kano contingent under the Emir's eldest son Tukur. Though Tukur strove to rally his men, the weight of the Kebbi charge swept them aside. Having broken the enemy ring Sama'ila proceeded to roll it up. The Fulani now found themselves in a hopeless position and before long their whole army was in flight, pursued by the triumphant Kebbi horse 13.
On this disastrous day it was left to one of the Sultan's nephews, the Marafa Maiturare, to strike the only effective blow for the Fulani and save their honour. When the Kebbi cavalry galloped off in pursuit of the main body of the army, they in turn exposed themselves. By keeping his own contingent of Tuaregs and Adarawa under firm control, the Marafa was therefore able to take them in the flank and rear. But the counter-attack, though it exacted some retribution, came too late to save the day 14.
This victory saved Kebbi from possible extinction. When every allowance has been made for Abdu's negligence, for the disloyalty to their commander of many of the Fulani, and for the part played by luck, it is still possible to discern a touch of genius about Sama'ila's tactics. For him it was the crowning victory of a brilliant military career.
For Abdu, on the other hand, it was only the beginning of a series of blunders and disasters.

The Kano Civil War

Later in the year 1993 the Emir Bello of Kano, died and with his death there began a fierce struggle for the succession between his branch of the family and the far more numerous clan of his predecessor, the Emir Abdullahi. The two candidates for the title were the heads of these two houses, Tukur and Yusufu.
In the recent expedition against Argungu, Tukur had been the only captain to show any enthusiasm or determination. His zeal must have stood out when so many others were hanging back and it did not pass unnoticed by the Sultan. In fact, tradition has it that Abdu then and there promised him the succession to Kano with the words: “Goronka Kano in ta fadi.” 15 As Abdu did not know what the wishes of the people of Kano were, it was a rash promise to have made and it was to cause him endless trouble. In fact, Yusufu's following, both in the city and in the Emirate, was far stronger than Tukur's and was determined to make him Emir at any cost. There was, therefore, a real danger that if he was not constitutionally appointed there would be civil war.
It so happened that when the Emir of Kano died the Waziri of Sokoto, Buhari, a grandson of Clapperton's old friend the Waziri Gidado, was passing through Kano on his way to the cast. On the death of the ruler in one of the greater Emirates it was traditionally the task of the Waziri to summon the Electors to the choice of a new Emir and to convey their recommendations to the Sultan for his confirmation. This Buhari now proceeded to do. The Kano Electors were unanimous in choosing Yusufu 16 and they added a rider saying that if he was not appointed they were convinced that blood would flow. The Waziri accordingly sent a message to Sokoto, which contained both the recommendation and the warning.
In Sokoto, Abdu now found himself in an awkward predicament. He had gone a long way, both morally and publicly, to committing himself to Tukur's cause, but now the Electors of Kano, unanimously and in the strongest terms, had rejected him. With the Kebbawa unsubdued in the west, Damagaram and the Hausa diehards still very active in the north, the British becoming more assertive in the south, and Rabeh contemplating fresh conquests in the cast, every canon of statecraft called out for prudence and caution in dealing with such an obviously explosive problem. But Abdu was determined not to be thwarted and sent a message back to the Waziri saying that he did not mind if entrails ran in Kano, much less blood, but that at all costs Tukur must be made Emir 17.
When the news of the Sultan's decision spread abroad in Kano city there was consternation. Abdullahi's whole clan, together with their henchmen, at once congregated at Yusufu's house to take counsel with one another. They decided that once Tukur had become Emir he would not rest until he had broken them, perhaps put them to death, and that the only safety lay in flight. And so, while the Waziri was investing the new Emir with the regalia of Kano in an almost empty mosque, Yusufu and all his supporters were clattering out of the Nassarawa Gate and turning their faces towards the east 18. It was tantamount to a declaration of war.
Yusufu now made his headquarters at Takai, a large town about fifty miles south-east of the capital, and at once began soliciting the support of the territorial magnates of the Empire. Some joined him; others remained loyal to Tukur. His next move was to send embassies to the neighbouring Emirates to enlist their help. At first it seemed as if Hadeija would back him, but when the Emir Muhammadu met the Waziri of Sokoto, he realized that to do so would mean plain defiance of the Sultan. Being unwilling to reopen the old breach, which had now healed, the Emir therefore withdrew his support 19.
Hadeija's neighbour to the north-west was Gumel, a small but warlike Emirate which owed loose allegiance to Damagaram, and Bornu and had never formed part of the Sokoto Empire. The Mangawa of Gumel, though they had adopted the Hausa language, were kin to the Kanuri and for the greater part of the century had been engaged in sporadic fighting with their Fulani neighbours, particularly those of Hadeija. For them there was no clash of loyalties, simply the prospect of some rich pickings, and so when Yusufu's envoy reached them they willingly promised their support 20. By calling them in, the insurgents acquired a powerful ally, but at the same time they dealt another blow at the cause of Fulani unity.
When he felt himself strong enough, Yusufu marched on Kano and attempted to take it by storm. He had no artillery, however, and the mud walls and heavy ironclad gates gave the defenders an overwhelming advantage. In spite of this the attackers succeeded in breaking in at one point, but they were at once counter-attacked and thrown out. With the failure of this assault, Yusufu withdrew again to Takai, leaving the prisoners who had been taken in the battle to be executed by Tukur.
For the next three months the rebels consolidated their strength in the south and cast of the Emirate. One after another the larger towns that had not already joined their cause were either intimidated into adherence or subdued by force of arms. With the capture of Gaya, Garko, and Kura, the Pretender's forces crept forward to within twenty miles of the city and it was obvious that another assault on the capital was imminent.
As the decisive moment approached, however, Yusufu suddenly fell mortally ill and his unexpected death placed his whole movement in jeopardy. None of his brothers possessed the same ascendancy as he and there was a danger that the cause would be rent by a struggle for the succession. Yusufu realized this and from his death-bed designated Aliyu Babba, one of his younger brothers, as his successor. He chose Aliyu for two reasons, partly because he possessed the necessary powers of leadership and partly because Aliyu, through his mother, was related by blood to the Sultan's family. Yusufu judged that this tie would one day lead to a reconciliation with Sokoto 21. In this he was ultimately to be proved right.
The strangest part of the interlude between the first and second attacks on Kano was the inaction of Tukur, who left the initiative entirely to his adversaries. He simply shut himself up in the capital and remained passive while Yusufu and Aliyu, by prising away one town after another, gradually undermined his authority and power. No doubt he felt too weak to risk a pitched battle, but his failure to make even sallies against his enemies, or to take any reprisals against those who deserted his cause, gave men the impression that he was wanting in courage and resolution. In any case, if he did not feel strong enough to tackle the rebels unaided, he should have appealed for help to his overlord. Similarly, in Sokoto the Sultan did nothing to assist his vassal until it was too late. Had he ordered Katsina, Zaria, Bauchi, and Katagum to reinforce Kano, Tukur could have taken the field with a powerful army and would in all probability have crushed the Pretender. We do not know why Abdu remained supine when his richest province was being riven by civil war, but it seems probable that he was inhibited by the memory of that disastrous day at Argungu and that he did not feel sure enough of the loyalty of his Emirs to call them out again for the purpose of repairing the blunder over the succession which they all knew to be his.
Early in 1894 Aliyu again advanced on Kano, city. The Emir, who had missed all his opportunities of harrying the rebels when they were weak and vulnerable, now committed another tactical error by leaving his defences and challenging them in the open. Not surprisingly, his outnumbered forces were defeated and driven back behind the walls. This reverse seems to have broken the morale of his army, for they offered little further resistance. Soon afterwards the rebels made a breach in the wall and overran the defences. Then, as Aliyu made a triumphant entry into the city from the south-east, Tukur with a few dispirited followers slipped out of it to the north-west 22.
Only now, when a manageable fire had become an ungovernable conflagration, did the Sultan suddenly begin to take all the measures which he should have put in hand months earlier. The Emir of Katsina was bidden to give Tukur asylum and repel the Kano forces if they should pursue him. The other Emirs were ordered to provide troops and the Waziri was sent to Katsina to take command of the army which was to restore Tukur to his throne 23. But it was all in vain. Abdu's orders were either ignored or at best obeyed with a dilatory reluctance that stultified them. No troops arrived for the Waziri to command and the Emir of Katsina shut himself up in his capital on the pretext that he had received news that the Hausa diehards were planning another raid 24. Tukur was therefore left in an exposed and vulnerable position on the Katsina-Kano boundary. When Aliyu finally came up with him at Tafashiya he made a desperate but hopeless last stand and went bravely to his death.
So ended the Kano civil war. No principles had been at stake and the struggle had really been nothing more than a dynastic contest for a vacant throne. Nevertheless, it had disrupted the life of the Emirate for the best part of a year. Indirectly, too, it was to have other no less damaging results.
Soon after the end of the civil war Kano again became embroiled with Damagaram. Ostensibly the bone of contention was the suzerainty of Gumel, whose traditional fealty to Damagaram had begun to waver from the time that its support of the Pretender had drawn it into Kano's orbit, but actually the underlying cause was probably the opportunism and cupidity of the Emir of Damagaram. While Kano's strength had been sapped by internal strife, his had recently been reinforced by fugitives from the Borma army which had been defeated by Rabeh 25. Hoping no doubt to profit by these changes of fortune, the Emir Ahmadu now mustered an expedition and led it southward.
Advancing through Gumel the Damagaram. forces encountered little opposition and soon reached the town of Gezawa, only twenty miles from the capital, and sacked it. From there the van pushed on and actually came in sight of the walls of the city. In doing so, however, they over-extended themselves and this gave the Kano force, which was waiting on the southern flanks of their march, an opportunity of interposing itself between their van and their rear. Moreover, when the van fell back, it failed to take proper military precautions and was lured into an ambush by a Kano drummer imitating its own rallying tattoo. The result was an unexpected victory for Kano and the discomfiture of the Damagaram army, which retreated northward in disorder 26.
In spite of his defeat the Emir of Damagaram returned in 1898 with a new army at his back, this time taking a more westerly route through Dambarta 27. The Kano forces marched out to bar his way and a pitched battle was fought near Tattarawa. In this the cannon and muskets of Damagaram proved to be too much for the Kano cavalry, which fled from the field. The Emir Aliyu was left exposed and, to evade capture, was forced to disguise himself as a Tuareg. Even then he barely escaped and indeed lost a number of his personal bodyguard 28.
The Damagaram army now advanced right up to the walls of Kano, pillaging and looting as they went. Inside the city, which was thronged with refugees from the surrounding towns and villages 29 as well as survivors from the battle, there was confusion and despondency. From the outside, however, the fortifications must have looked immensely strong. Moreover, the assailants knew that, since the days of the Jukuns, the place had never been taken. The Emir of Damagaram did not attempt an assault, therefore, but raised the siege and marched home with his booty 30.
The Damagaram invasions were not the only baneful consequences to flow from the Kano civil war. Hardly less serious, in its wider context, was the damage that it did to the prestige and authority of the Sultan. When soon afterwards Abdu allowed himself to be reconciled to Aliyu and acknowledged him as the lawful Emir of Kano, he was only bowing to necessity. Nevertheless his action, coming so soon after Tukur's death, destroyed the last vestige of trust that his subjects bore him. Henceforth he was seldom called by his real name or accorded his title of Commander of the Faithful. Instead he was derisively referred to as Abdu Danyen Kasko or Abdu the Unbaked Pot.

Foreign Affairs

It will be recalled that in 1885 the Sultan Umaru and the Royal Niger Company had signed a treaty, which incidentally had been reaffirmed five years later and slightly widened in scope, and that in 1891 Goldie had paid a visit to the Emir of Nupe in an effort to reach an understanding with him.
After Goldie's visit to Bida, the Emir evidently referred to his overlord in Gwandu the demand that he should desist from slave-raiding in Kabba and the Emir of Gwandu must in turn have consulted the Sultan about it. For once Abdu seems to have counselled patience and conciliation, for the Emir of Gwandu, in acknowledging his instructions, wrote to him as follows:

After greetings, I have seen your letter about the Christians and have sent to Sarkin Nupe telling him to watch his step, leave them alone, keep faith with them, and bring about a reconciliation between them and us provided that they do not break their agreement and stir up strife or show deceit. I too have written to them in a spirit of conciliation.
May God help us and grant us increase.
This with peace. 31

Notes
1. Oral tradition preserved in Sokoto.
2. Alhaji Junaidu, op. cit. pp. 59 and 70.
3. Sokoto DNBs, History of Talata Mafara.
4. Ibid. Histories of Talata Mafara and Tureta.
5. Sarkin Burmi Abdulbaki, Abdulbaki Taniwaddarin Tureta, Zaria, 1954, vol. I, pp. 3-7.
6. Alhaji Junaidu, op. cit. p. 61.
7. P. L. Monteil, De St. Louis à Tripoli par le Lac Tchad, Paris, 1894.
8. Information given to the author by a Katsina man who took part in the expedition.
9. Oral tradition preserved in Argungu and confirmed by Alhaji Junaidu.
10. Oral tradition preserved in the Kebbi ruling family.
11. Ibid.
12. F. Edgar, Tatsuniyoyi na Hausa. Edinburgh, 1911, vol. II, pp. 337-40. 3
13. Oral tradition preserved in the Kebbi ruling family.
14. Alhaji Junaidu, oral tradition.
15. Oral tradition preserved in Kano and Sokoto. The phrase means “Your reward [literally cola-nut] shall be Kano when it falls.”
16. For the family tree, see Table 4 in Appendix II.
17. Oral tradition preserved in Kano and Sokoto.
18. Alhaji Abubakar, op, cit. p. 62.
19 Alhaji Junaidu, op. cit. pp. 62-63.
20. Gumel Emirate Notebook, Historical Note.
21. Alhaji Abubakar, op. cit. p. 63. Aliyu's mother was a daughter of Sultan Aliyu Babba.
22. Alhaji Abubakar, op. cit. p. 65.
23. Alhaji Junaidu, op. cit. pp. 67-68.
24. Ibid.
25. Y. Urvoy, Histoire de l'Empire de Bornou, Paris, 1947, p. 127.
26. C. G. B. Gidley, Mantanfas—A Study in Oral Tradition, African Languages Studies, vol. VI, 1965, pp. 34-35.
27. The Emir Ahmadu apparently convinced himself that he owed his defeat entirely to a Kano astrologer. Having induced this man to change sides, he launched his second attempt. Gidley, loc. cit. p. 35.
28. Ibid. p. 36.
29. Gidley, op. cit. p. 36.
30. Ibid. p. 37. This time, according to tradition, it was the Kano wizards who prevailed and, having been ordered to cast a spell on Ahmadu, succeeded in making him ill.
31. Backwell, op. cit. cf. Letter, no. III.
32. Hertslet, op. cit.
33. Alhaji Junaidu asserts that Abdu never signed it and this seems to be borne out by Hertslet, who quotes the Gwandu treaty but makes no mention of any treaty with Sokoto in 1894.
34. Alhaji Junaidu, op. cit. p. 69. On the other hand, Lugard's reports suggest that the subsidy was paid in 1900. See Annual Reports, Northern Nigeria, 1900-11, p. 82.
35. A letter written in Zaria by the Waziri Buhari to Sultan Abdu has survived saying that he is sending Rabeh's messenger on to Sokoto with an escort. See Letter, no. 99 in The Occupation of Hausaland.
36. Kirk-Greene, op. cit. p. 49.
37. See the second part of Note 16 in Appendix I.
38. Gazetteer of Sokoto Province, pp. 34-35.

London. Ibadan. Nairobi: Oxford University Press. 1967. 312 p.