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While Rabeh, like a rogue elephant, was moving
slowly westward towards Lake Chad, another more serious threat to
the integrity and independence of the Fulani Empire was beginning to
build up in the south.
In medieval times West Africa was almost completely cut off from
Europe by the double barrier of the Sahara and the Moslem powers of
North Africa and Spain. In the fifteenth century, however, the
seamen of Portugal turned the flank of these obstacles by sailing
their ships down to the Gulf of Guinea.
Next, at the end of the eighteenth century, the geographers,
fascinated by the mysteries of the still unknown continent, suddenly
conceived and imparted to the public a new interest in Africa. This
was soon enlarged by the humanitarians who at about the same time
launched the campaign for the abolition of the slave trade. In
accordance with the theory that the best way of eradicating the
traffic in slaves was to supplant it by legitimate trade, this in
turn led to a new commercial interest in Africa as a source of raw
materials and as a market for manufactured goods.
Even so, however, because of the difficulties of geography and
climate, progress was extremely slow. After the death of Clapperton,
Richard Lander returned to Africa and in 1830, by sailing down the
Niger from Bussa to the sea, established the fact that the river
flowed into the Bight of Benin. Two years later some Liverpool
merchants, under the leadership of MacGregor Laird and with the
backing of the British Government, sought to use this discovery to
open up trade with the hinterland. The two ships which they
commissioned succeeded in steaming 500 miles up the river, but the
climate killed three-quarters of the European company and so the
project was abandoned,
In 1841 the British Government made another attempt to penetrate
into the interior. This time a naval expedition was sent up the
river with instructions to suppress the slave trade, make treaties
with friendly Chiefs, and establish a model farm. Once again,
however, there was very heavy mortality among the Europeans-over a
third in the space of two months-and the scheme was abandoned
without achieving anything except the founding of the town of Lokoja.
It was not until IS 1854, by which time the prophylactic use of
quinine as a safeguard against malaria had been introduced, that the
British had any success with their riverain ventures. In that year
another expedition organized by MacGregor Laird and led by Baikie
was completely successful. Not only did all its members survive but
the trading that they were able to do paid all expenses and still
yielded a profit. This proved to be the turning-point.
During the next few years MacGregor Laird and Baikie succeeded in
developing the riverain trade. In doing so, however, they aroused
the hostility of the other Liverpool merchants and their allies on
the coast, the Brassmen, who found themselves losing the profitable
entrepôt trade with the interior that they had hitherto enjoyed.
Indeed, in the late 'sixties, by which time Laird was dead and
Baikie had been compelled by ill health to retire, their opposition
almost strangled the new line of communications with the interior.
But once again the British Government, faithful to their belief that
fostering legitimate commerce was the best means of stamping out the
slave trade, decided to intervene. In 1871 they therefore sent an
envoy to the Emir of Nupe to enlist his support and protection for
the river traffic against those who were trying to kill it. The
Emir, Masaba, was quick to see the advantages which such an
arrangement would have for himself and his people and so he accepted
the proposals on condition that Nupe, in return for its protection,
should become the sole channel for trade between the British
companies and the Fulani Empire. The British, who were anxious to
withdraw their naval patrols from the river, accepted this
stipulation 1.
Up to this point there had been little or no rivalry in Africa
between the European nations. The curiosity shown had been
scientific and the interest either humanitarian or commercial. The
absence of any atmosphere of competition along national lines was
illustrated by the fact that, as late as the 'fifties, the British
Government was employing Germans to undertake its exploring. In
1861, it is true, Lagos was declared a Colony, but this move was
made in the interest of suppressing the maritime slave trade and not
for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement. Indeed, a few years
later a Select Committee of the House of Commons, reflecting the
political indifference of the day to colonial expansion, recommended
not only that there should be no more acquisitions in Africa but
that Britain should consider freeing itself from some of its
commitments.
In the next decade the attitude of the principal European powers
towards Africa suddenly underwent a radical change. It was perhaps
inevitable that the bitter rivalries that divided them at home would
sooner or later affect their activities abroad. The indirect cause
of the change was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1. After her
defeat France sought to assuage her wounded pride by a policy of
expansion overseas. Before long Germany, fearful lest France might
be stealing a march on her, also entered the race and soon became
the pacemaker. Last of all, encouraged by one faction and restrained
by another, now thrustful, now hesitant, came Great Britain. The
principal consequence of the sharpening and extension of these
rivalries was the so-called ‘Scramble for Africa’ which occupied
the European Powers during the last two decades of the century and
several times brought them to the brink of war,
At this point there appeared upon the scene a remarkable man, Sir
George Goldie, whose vision and determination were to be the main
factors in deciding the course that events were to take in this part
of Africa. Coming of a good family and possessing a considerable
private fortune, he had had a short and chequered career in the Army
before resigning his commission to take over a small firm in which
his family had an interest. This firm was engaged in the Niger trade
and had recently run into difficulties. In 1876 Goldie went to West
Africa to find out for himself exactly what was amiss. Having
diagnosed the trouble as excessive competition between companies
that were individually weak, he next persuaded his competitors to
agree to a series of mergers which led to the formation of a single
British group called the United African Company, later renamed the
National African Company 2. Then in
1881, having emerged as Chairman and undisputed leader of the new
Company, he applied for a Royal Charter, but with this request he
was unsuccessful.
At this time the political situation in the Bight of Benin was
highly confused. The French had established themselves in Dahomey
and the Germans in the Cameroons. Between them the British had set
up the Colony of Lagos and the Niger Coast Protectorate, but these
were not contiguous and in any case did not cover the hinterland to
which all three powers were laying conflicting claims.
To resolve these disputes the Germans called the Berlin Conference
of 1884. This proved to be Goldie's great opportunity. First of all
he persuaded the British Government that they had no chance of
getting their claims to the Niger-Benue hinterland recognized unless
they accepted the National African Company as their chosen
instrument and based their arguments on the monopoly which the
Company had established on the rivers and the numerous treaties
which it had concluded with neighbouring Chiefs. At the eleventh
hour Goldie's scheme was almost upset by the appearance of two
French firms to challenge his monopoly. By engaging in a ruthless
price-war, however, he broke them both just before the Conference
began. His plan was therefore adopted by the British Government and
the British Government's claims to a sphere of influence over the
whole area were in turn accepted by France and Germany 3.
In 1885 Goldie consolidated the position of the Company still
further by engaging the explorer Joseph Thomson and sending him up
to Sokoto to make treaties with the Sultan and the Emir of Gwandu 4.
A year later the British Government acknowledged the commanding
position that Goldie had thus built up by granting the Charter which
they had previously refused. In this way the Royal Niger Company
came into being 5.
The ambivalent attitude of Britain to colonial affairs has already
been mentioned. On the one side there were men like Rhodes and
Goldie, with their supporters at home, who fervently and sincerely
believed that the country had an imperial mission to perform and who
were determined to do everything in their power to extend British
influence in the world. On the other there were men who, with equal
sincerity and fervour, questioned Britain's right to interfere in
the affairs of other people and deplored the expense of colonial
entanglements. The ordinary British voter, pulled this way and that
between the two factions, probably shared both the pride of the
imperialists in the achievements of their countrymen in distant
parts of the world and the dismay of the Little Englanders at the
expense that these achievements involved. Chartered Companies,
though they were Elizabethan anachronisms, were therefore
resuscitated with the idea that they would resolve this
contradiction and, by combining government and trade, would enlarge
the British Empire without adding to the burdens of the British
Exchequer.
When the British Government gave the Royal Niger Company its charter
they conferred upon it the right to govern as well as to trade.
Armed with the Charter, the Company immediately began to create the
machinery of government that it needed to discharge these
responsibilities. The Board of Directors became the Council and were
invested with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
As a legislature they enacted the laws of the territory, as an
executive they were the source of all policy decisions, and as a
judiciary they were the final court of appeal. The Chairman, now
styled Governor, was a figure-head and Goldie, as Deputy Governor
and Political Administrator, continued to keep all the reins of
power in his own hands 6.
The Council now proceeded to set up a civil service and a judiciary.
For the most part this simply meant endowing the Company's District
Agents with administrative and judicial powers, but a few new posts
were created at the top of the staff pyramid and a number of fresh
appointments were made to fill them. The major innovation, however,
was the creation of a Constabulary. At first its strength was 150
African rank and file under three European officers, but the numbers
were later increased to nearly 500. The name Constabulary was
misleading for it was, in fact, a small army, equipped with modern
rifles, supported by machine-guns and artillery, and kept
concentrated for use as a striking force 7.
The Company's whole commercial and administrative organization was
based upon the river systems of the Lower Niger and Benue. Its
administrative headquarters were at Asaba, opposite Onitsha, and its
depots and workshops were in the Delta. Its fleet consisted of
twenty to twenty-five river steamers of which, however, only
one-third were large vessels 8. They
were employed as circumstances dictated, for taking trade goods up
river, evacuating the produce of the country, moving staff from one
station to another, or transporting the Constabulary on punitive
expeditions. Within its limitations this system of communication
served the Company fairly well, but it had two great weaknesses. The
first was that a series of rapids above Jebba prevented navigation
much beyond that point. The second was that, above the confluence at
Lokoja, the drop in the water-level of the Niger and to an even
greater extent the Benue made navigation impossible, at any rate for
the larger ships, during much of the long dry season.
The Company's dependence on water transport was revealed by the
distribution of its stations. Of the forty which it had in 1889, all
were situated on the river system and over half were on the Lower
Niger below Lokeja. On the Niger above Lokoja there were seven and
along the whole length of the Benue only ten. In these two sectors
the principal stations were Lokeja, Eggan, Loko, and Ibi 9.
In deploying its administrative and trading stations along the Niger
and Benue, the Company was brought into touch with all the southern
Emirates of the Fulani Empire and particularly with Nupe, Ilorin,
Muri, and Adamawa. Through the town of Wase, with which it had
trouble, it also made contact with Bauchi, whose Emir consented to
sign a treaty.
In addition to the Emirates, however, many of the petty pagan
Chiefdoms that lay outside the borders of the Empire also came
within the Company's purview. As the two sides were often at war
with one another, the Company, which was bound to both sides by
treaty, was constantly in danger of becoming embroiled in their
disputes. Furthermore, as the main cause of the fighting was the
slave-raiding of the Emirs and the reprisals of the Chiefs, the
difficulties of the Company's staff were aggravated by the fact
that, whereas the treaties entered into by the Emits did not bind
them to desist from slave raiding, those of the Chiefs entitled them
to call upon the protection of the Company if they were raided 10.
In these circumstances it was inevitable that the Company was often
faced with the choice between failing one side or coming into
collision with the other.
All the expenses of the administration, Constabulary, and judiciary
had to be borne on the trading revenues of the Company. To meet them
Goldie used the Company's legislative powers first to set up tariff
barriers and then to preserve a rigid commercial monopoly within
those barriers. In this way he managed to pay his way, but his
actions provoked such bitter protests, including some which the
German Government took up, combined with so many allegations of
maladministration and abuse of power, that the British Government
was compelled to set up a commission of inquiry 11.
The Commissioner, Major C. M. Macdonald, completed his inquiry in
1889 and his findings throw an interesting light on the contemporary
scene. It is clear, for example that the Emirs who had signed
treaties or concluded agreements with the Company did not consider
that they had made over any of their sovereignty. The Emir of
Nassarawa, it is true, had sold a strip of land covering the north
bank of the Benue throughout his territory, but had entered into no
other commitments. The Emirs of Muri and Keffi had signed treaties,
but had conceded no political rights. Indeed, in the Muri Treaty, so
far from the Company's obtaining concessions in return for a
guarantee of protection, it was the Emir who was required to protect
the Company. In Nupe, likewise, the Emir had always considered
himself as the protector of the Company and consequently, when
offered a treaty in which the roles were to be reversed, he refused
to sign it and would do no more than make an ordinary commercial
agreement 12.
Difficulties of language probably lay at the root of many of the
misunderstandings that now came to light. Nearly all the treaties
had been concluded through the medium of interpreters. Being men of
humble position, they perhaps did not themselves fully understand
the affairs of state that they were called upon to discuss. In any
case, they would have been anxious to please their employers without
offending the Emirs and so there was a constant temptation to skate
over difficulties and leave misunderstandings unresolved.
Of course, the treaties between the Company and the vassal Emirates
were to some extent overridden by, and therefore of much less
importance than, the treaties between the Company and the two
overlords. Thanks to the explorer Thomson, Goldie had secured these
as early as 1885, even before he had gained his Charter. The Sultan
at that time had been Umaru and he, no doubt recalling that it had
always been the desire of his grandfather Bello to make an alliance
with Great Britain and open a channel for maritime trade, had signed
a treaty, as had the Emir of Gwandu, Maliki, soon afterwards.
Under the terms of the Sokoto Treaty the Sultan had first of all
granted to the Directors of the Company “my entire rights to the
country on both sides of the River Benue and rivers flowing into it
throughout my dominions for such distance from its and their banks
as they may desire” 13. Secondly,
he had recognized that ‘among foreigners’ the Company should
have the sole right to trade and to extract minerals. Thirdly, he
had acknowledged the Company to be the sole channel for all
communications between him and foreigners ‘coming from the
rivers’. Fourthly, he had agreed that the grant of these rights
was irrevocable. In return for these concessions the Company had
undertaken to pay him an annual subsidy of 3,000 bags of cowries,
then valued at about £1,500 14.
The terms of the treaty with Gwandu had been similar, except that
the cession of land had related to the banks of the Niger and its
tributaries as well as to the Benue and had been more definite,
specifying a distance of ten hours' journey inland, or such other
distance as the Company might desire, from each bank 15.
It is regrettable that Macdonald did not visit Sokoto and Gwandu and
therefore never had the opportunity of questioning the Sultan and
the Emir about their understanding of these treaties. We know,
however, that when he revealed to the Nupe Council the terms of the
Gwandu Treaty, and particularly the clause about the cession of land
along the banks of the Niger, they were frankly incredulous and
stoutly maintained that the Emir of Gwandu would never have signed
such an agreement 16. It is therefore
difficult to escape the conclusion that in these two major treaties,
as in many of the minor ones, the contracting parties had different
ideas about what had been agreed upon. It is in any case certain
that, whatever Goldie and later Lugard chose to read into the
agreements, neither the Sultan nor the Emir of Gwandu supposed for a
moment that they had bargained away any of their own sovereignty or
their inherited authority over their vassals.
Macdonald's general conclusions were that, while the Company had
gone too far in establishing a monopoly, the graver charges of abuse
of office that had been brought against it were unfounded. But on
the political side he had to report that, despite its treaties,
which in any case were often ambiguous, its practical jurisdiction
was limited, even along the rivers, and that its writ hardly ran at
all beyond their banks 17. To the
British Government the Company's lack of real authority came as
disturbing news, because in international affairs the importance of
effective occupation was now beginning to outweigh the mere
possession of treaties. Similarly, Macdonald's criticisms of the
Company's monopolistic practices placed them in a dilemma, because
they knew that it was only by exploiting a commercial monopoly that
the Company could afford to carry its administrative and military
expenses.
The Liberal Government which was then in office was unwilling
either to assume direct responsibility for the Niger Territories or
yet to surrender them to another European power. It therefore took
the line of least resistance and did nothing.
It is now recognized that Goldie was one of the originators of
the system of colonial administration which later came to be termed
Indirect Rule. From the start he insisted that it was not the
Company's business to establish a system of government in the Niger
Territories. The policy which he laid down, therefore, was that the
Company would interfere as little as possible in the internal
affairs of local States or tribes but would leave government to the
traditional feudal or tribal authorities 18.
He held these views from conviction, Dot out of necessity, but the
pattern of events proved to be a good deal more complicated than he
had expected and in the end he was compelled to modify his policy.
Indeed, at this period the political situation along the Niger and
Benue Rivers was highly unstable. The fact that some of the States
belonged to the Fulani Empire and that others did not was only one
of the causes of the turmoil in which they all lived. Other reasons,
apart from the constant slave-raiding of the Fulani and the periodic
reprisals of the pagans, were risings such as those of the Tiv in
1885-6, dynastic disputes such as those of Muri Emirate in the
'nineties, land piracy such as that of the Takum renegade Kachalla
on the Benue caravans 19, and,
finally, the intrigues of the agents of other European powers such
as Hoenigsberg in Nupe and Mizon in Muri and Adamawa 20.
It was all very well to say in theory that the Company would not
interfere in such matters, but in practice, as Goldie discovered, it
was drawn into them by its treaties and by the need to defend its
allies and uphold its prestige. In any case, if trade was to
flourish and the Company pay its way, it was imperative to establish
a measure of order. Punitive expeditions became fairly common,
therefore, and these sometimes culminated in fighting.
A further complication was that international tension, which had
been relieved by the Berlin settlement of 1884, now started to mount
again. The agreement of 1890 between Britain and France had fixed
the northern boundary of the British sphere of influence and that of
1893 between Britain and Germany had settled the eastern boundary.
But only half the western boundary had been determined and so, as
the principle of effective occupation was coming to be generally
accepted, the French felt free to press their claims to the Nikki-Bussa-Kaiama
area which had hitherto been regarded as part of the Company's
territories. These moves caused consternation in London and Goldie
was called on by the Government to forestall the French.
At the same time, now that the British Protectorate over the
Yoruba States was becoming more of a reality, the war between llorin
and Ibadan, which had been going on intermittently ever since lbadan
had been founded after the destruction of Old Oyo, was beginning to
cause concern. In London it was assumed that florin was the
aggressor simply because the Fulani had started the war two
generations earlier and because they had subsequently earned a bad
name as slave-raiders. As Ilorin fell within the Company's sphere of
influence, the British Government now began to press Goldie to bring
the Emir to heel, if necessary by the use of force 21.
Goldie at the time was too preoccupied with the Company's
internal problems, especially Nupe, to care much about these
external difficulties. Nupe had never made a political treaty with
the Company and the differences between them were now coming to a
head. In the 'sixties the Emir Masaba had overrun the small tribes
— Yagbas, Bunus, Kakandas, Kupas, and Eggas — who inhabited
Kabba and ever since then the Nupes had regarded Kabba as one of
their preserves 22. In recent years,
however, their raids had been carried out on a scale that had
brought trade to a standstill and threatened to depopulate the whole
country. Even Lokeja, the headquarters of the Company's northern
region, had been threatened and so the Company, in defence of its
vital interests but in contradiction of its avowed policy of
non-intervention, had been compelled to warn the Nupes to keep their
distance 23. This had led to great
tension.
Towards the end of 1891 Goldie decided to go to Bida himself in
the hope of reaching a settlement. When he met the Emir Abubakr
there he assured him that the Company had no intention of attacking
and occupying Nupe and he promised that its servants would not
interfere in the internal affairs of the Emirate. In return he
demanded that the Nupes should stop raiding for slaves in the
Company's territories outside the Emirate. If they persisted, he
threatened to declare war, blockade them, and divert their trade to
other Emirates. Although the Emir professed himself satisfied with
these terms, Goldie left Bida with the feeling that war would not be
long delayed 24.
In fact, the Emir did not keep his bargain. Before long his men
were operating in Kabba again and a clash between them and the
Constabulary became almost inevitable. It came when the Nupe forces
surrounded one of the Company's patrols and took prisoner two
British officers and forty-five African rank and file. Although they
were all subsequently released, this episode seems to have convinced
Goldie that the time had come for a showdown with Nupe. As he had
already undertaken to send an expedition against Ilorin, he
determined to combine the two operations and to mount them in the
forthcoming dry season 25.
Goldie did not make the mistake of underrating his opponents. He
determined to command the expedition himself and he saw to it that
his troops, who numbered only 500 under 30 British officers, were
given every possible advantage of modern science and technology.
Their equipment included searchlights and wire to foil night attacks
and they were supported by artillery and six machine-guns 26.
In the Nupe campaign Goldie exploited two weaknesses in the
Emir's position, the presence of half his army on the south side of
the Niger and the fact that to recall these troops to the defence of
his capital he had to rely on the canoes of the river tribes, who
were neither Moslems nor particularly loyal to the Fulani régime.
While Goldie and the troops marched against the Nupe contingent In
Kabba, Wallace with the river steamers raised the river people in
revolt against them and so cut their line of retreat. When they fell
back, therefore, they were unable to get across the water and took
no further part in the campaign.
The expedition, coming up behind them, was soon ferried across
the river and continued its march on Bida. The main Nupe army,
massed in considerable strength in front of the capital and nearly
all mounted, put up a stout resistance. On the first day they
charged the column with such dash and determination that for a time,
while the troops were forming square, the issue of the battle hung
in the balance. Though they failed to break the square, they did
succeed in forcing Goldie to fall back on his camp.
On the following day the troops advanced again, this time in
square formation from the start, and the volleys of the riflemen,
supported by the fire of the machine-guns, beat off all the attacks
of the Nupe cavalry. A mile and a half from the city they halted
while the artillery cleared the defenders from the walls. After this
they advanced again until they were within range of the centre of
the city. An artillery bombardment was then begun, which set the
town ablaze and scattered the remaining defenders 27.
And so, on 27 January 1897, Bida fell to the troops of the Royal
Niger Company and Nupe capitulated.
After a few days rest Goldie returned to the Niger and, with
about half the original forces, was transported upstream to Jebba.
From there he marched south on Ilorin. The battle for Ilorin was a
repetition of the battle for Bida except that the opposition was
less stiff. The llorin cavalry charged courageously against the
square but could make no headway against the rifle and machine-gun
fire. When Goldie called for a surrender his demand was refused. The
city was therefore shelled, set on fire, and finally occupied 28.
In this campaign Goldie had employed most of his military resources
and risked the Company's very existence. In a military sense he had
been brilliantly successful, but his victories had left him with
political and administrative problems to solve. In llorin his
solution was to reappoint the defeated Emir Sulimanu, in Bida to
depose the Emir Abubakr and appoint another member of the ruling
family, Muhammadu, in his place. Both Emirs on appointment had to
acknowledge the Company as their new suzerain and to agree to
conform to such directions as the representatives of the Company
might from time to time give 29.
The handicap from which Goldie now suffered was that, at a time
when he needed the backing of a great nation to exploit his success
and carry out his ideas, he could call only upon the resources of a
medium-sized company. They were not enough for the task and the
settlement that he had imposed by force was soon to crumble away.
Notes
1. J. E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria, London,
1960, p. 25.
2. Flint, op. cit. pp. 30-33 and 44-46.
3. Flint, op. cit. pp. 62-70.
4. Ibid. pp. 89-90.
5. Ibid. pp. 70-87.
6. Flint, op. cit. pp. 91-92.
7. Ibid. pp. 93 and 142.-4.
8. Ibid. p. 142.
9. Flint, op. cit. pp. 144-5.
10. Ibid. pp. 129-55.
11. Ibid. pp. 98-119.
12. Flint, op. cit. pp. 129-55.
13. Ibid. p. 89.
14. For the texts of the treaties see The Map of Africa by Treaty by
Sir E. Hertslet, London, 1909, vol. I, pp. 122-56. The fact that the
Sultan agreed to accept a subsidy does not mean that he regarded
himself as in any way dependent on the Company. On the contrary, it
is significant that Alhaji Junaidu (op. cit. p. 69) uses the word
gaimwa to describe it, a term that denotes either a sweetener or
else the gift offered by an inferior to a superior.
15. Flint, op. cit. p. 89.
16. Ibid. pp. 140-1.
17. Ibid. pp. 151-2.
18. Flint, op. cit. pp. 94-95.
19. Gazetteer of Muri Province, pp. 6-20.
20. Flint, op. cit. pp. 144 ff. and 168 ff.
21. Flint, op cit. pp. 232 ff.
22. Gazetteer of Ilorin Province, p. 19.
23. Flint, op. cit. pp. 234-5.
24. Flint, op. cit. p. 235.
25. Ibid. p. 240.
26. Ibid. pp. 243-63.
27. Flint, op. cit. pp. 250-3.
28. Ibid. p. 255.
29. Ibid. pp. 254 and 256.
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