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In the jihad
in Hausaland it had been the
Hausa ruling classes rather than the Hausa people who had suffered defeat. Some of them had fled with their Chiefs and
become the diehards of:
·
Maradi
·
Tsibiri
·
Argungu
·
Abuja
Others, without going into exile, had moved
away and begun new lives elsewhere. Others again had stayed in their
towns and villages and simply retired into private life. Except for
those who had adhered to Shehu's
cause, therefore, and outside Zamfara they were a small and
unimportant minority, the feudal rulers of the Hausa States, when
they had lost the war, had also abandoned or forfeited all their
titles and offices.
The
Fulani leaders had fought the war to purify religion, not to reform
the social or economic structure of society. When they emerged as
the victors, therefore, they did little to change the feudal system
which they had inherited from the departed Hausa rulers. They
simply took it over. Those who had distinguished themselves in the
war obtained for themselves and their families the spoils of victory
in the shape of the posts which the defeated Hausas had vacated and
the privileges which went with them.
is
not easy to describe in summary form the feudal system which the
Fulani inherited from the Hausas and themselves elaborated, firstly,
because it varied from Emirate to Emirate and, secondly, because it
did not stand still but developed as the century wore on. If due
allowance is made for these difficulties, however, a description in
broad and general terms can be attempted.
The first point to be emphasized is that the
society which the Fulani ruled was a complex
one, not only because the people who made it up were separated by
differences of race, religion, and language but equally because the
Emirates which comprised the Empire were diverse in size and
heterogeneous in structure and composition. Even the Emirates that
had previously been Hausa States normally embodied older chiefdoms
and principalities, swallowed at an earlier date but still only
half-digested, and to these the jihad
often added fresh conquests.
The Emirate of Zaria provides a good example of this diversity. In
Hausa times it already contained the petty principalities of Kajuru,
Kauru, and Fatika. To these the Fulani later added Kagarko, Lere,
and Durum. In addition, however, the jihad
and the period of expansion that followed it brought four satellites
into Zaria's orbit, namely Jema'a, Keffi, Nassarawa, and Doma. By
the end of the Fulani conquests, therefore, Zaria was made up of
three separate components — the fiefs into which the main body of
the Emirate was subdivided, its six minor vassals, and its four
larger satellites 1.
The relationship between the Emir of Zaria and
each of the three components of the Emirate was different. The four
satellites naturally enjoyed the greatest measure of independence.
Originally, as already described, the founders of three of them had
intended going to Shehu in the hope of receiving flags direct from him, but they had
been told by Mallam Musa,
the first Fulani Emir, that they were too late because Shehu had already conferred upon him possession of the whole
territory as far south as the Benue. They had therefore been content
to receive their flags from Zaria instead of from Sokoto. As for the
fourth of these founding fathers, Makama
Dogo of Nassarawa, he had been encouraged by the Emir of Zaria
to carve a new Emirate out of the decaying Igbirra kingdom of Panda
and there had therefore never been any question of his paying homage
elsewhere than in Zaria.
These Chieftaincies were recognized from the
start as being hereditary in the families of their founders. Each
had its own Electoral College and the role of the Emir of Zaria at
this stage was only to confirm the choices made by the electors and
install the new Emirs. These Emirs enjoyed considerable latitude.
They had their own administrative hierarchies and judiciaries. They
wielded powers of life and death. They imposed what taxes they
pleased. Although, of course, forbidden from fighting among
themselves, they did not require their overlord's permission to make
war on the Hausa diehards of Abuja or to raid and harry their pagan
neighbours. The main symbol of their subordinate standing was the
annual tribute that they had to pay to Zaria. This consisted of 100
slaves from each of them together with horses, gowns, corn, salt,
locust-beans, palm-oil, cola nuts, mats, and cowries 2.
The authority of the six vassals, as one would
expect, was not as great as that of the satellites. True, their
dynasties were hereditary, they had their own administrative
hierarchies, and they enjoyed full discretion in assessing and
collecting tax. On the other hand, they themselves were denied
powers of life and death and the jurisdiction of their courts was
limited to minor cases. Similarly, in military matters they were not
free to go to war or even to undertake a raid without their
overlord's permission. Moreover, the Emir of Zaria had the authority
to depose as well as to appoint them 3.
Even more restricted, of course, were the
powers of the hakimai or fief-holders in the main body of the
Emirate. Their fiefs were sometimes hereditary or quasi-hereditary,
especially the major ones which might be vested in some branch of
the ruling family or in some noble house whose founder had played a
prominent part in the jihad,
but the majority were not tied to any particular family and were
freely in the gift of the Emir. Similarly, while the major
fief-holders might have large enough responsibilities for their
personal followers to be organized into a proper hierarchy, the
remainder commanded little more than a set of henchmen who served
them, whenever the occasion demanded, as troopers, constables,
gaolers, bailiffs, tax-gatherers, and messengers, in short, as
men-at-arms in war and factotums in peace.
These fief-holders, great and small, though
their powers were circumscribed, nevertheless occupied positions of
basic importance in the feudal system of the Empire. Their duties
were partly civil, partly military, and partly judicial, and they
were the first of the vital links which connected the Emirs and
their Courts to the peasants in their villages. In peace they were
responsible for the maintenance of law and order, for the collection
of tax and tribute, for the execution of any orders that the Emir
might from time to time give, and for carrying out such local tasks
as clearing tracks, repairing town walls, and supervising markets.
In the judicial sphere they were required to leave cases covered by
the Shari'a to the courts,
but they were empowered to deal with Siyasa 4 cases if they were not grave
enough to send to the Emir. Land disputes were also regarded as
coming within their purview. In addition, of course, as they were
vassals of a Moslem Sultan, they were bound to do all in their power
to uphold Islam. Finally, as the eyes and cars of their overlords,
they were expected to know all that was going on in their fiefs and
to report to the Emir anything that might endanger the state or the
dynasty 5.
In return for the position of privilege which
these-offices conferred, their holders were required to render
military service when called upon to do so and to bring with them a
recognized number of men-at-arms whom they had to equip. In this
respect the system closely resembled the feudal structure of
medieval Europe. A summons to serve was naturally answered with more
eagerness if there were chances of capturing prisoners or taking
booty but, however hard the prospect, it could never be ignored. To
do so would be tantamount to rebelling.
Fief-holders had two sources of remuneration,
one official and regulated, the other largely unregulated but
nevertheless officially condoned. The official source was a share,
generally one fifth, of all the tax and tribute that the fief-holder
collected. As there was no census, however, the Emir had only a
general idea, based on his own observation and the yield of earlier
years, of the return to expect from any particular fief. This lack
of precise information gave an unscrupulous hakimi some latitude to
enrich himself by under-declaration or over-collection. The other
source of revenue was perquisites. The scale on which these could be
exploited was to some extent governed by tradition and by the
operation of public opinion, but generally speaking fief-holders had
a free hand to accept what they considered fair or to demand as much
as they thought they could get.
Although the fief-holders could and indeed
often did abuse the system for their private gain, it would be wrong
to think of them, as a class, simply as parasites on society and
oppressors of the poor. Their positions in the hierarchy were only
intermediate ones and much of what they received from their
inferiors as presents they had to pass on to their superiors. From
what they kept, moreover, they had to feed, clothe, house, arm, and
sometimes pay the staff with which they administered their fiefs.
Some of the great fiefs, such as Gwadabawa in
Sokoto or Dutse in Kano, were geographically compact and not
dissimilar to English counties. But this was the exception, not the
rule, and fiefs generally tended to be scattered, having at the most
a core in one part of the Emirate and outlying towns and villages in
other parts. In Sokoto itself this fragmentation went so far that it
took the first British Resident about two years of hard work to
trace the ramifications of the fiefs and regroup them into
self-contained districts 6.
Although many hakimai
lived in their fiefs and administered them personally, there were
others who did not do so, either because the towns and villages
entrusted to them were too scattered to make local administration
possible or else because they were councillors or courtiers and had
to live in the capital. In such cases local administration was
entrusted to Village Heads and a confidential messenger, called a jekada,
served as the link between them and their overlord. Naturally, this
indirect form of administration was more open to abuse than the
system whereby the fief-holder ruled his domain personally and was
accessible to complaints and appeals from his people 7.
Judged by modern standards, this whole system of administration
through the feudal hierarchy was rough and ready. On the other hand,
it was probably more advanced than any other system in black Africa
at that time. What was more important was that it worked and that at
its best it provided a benevolent if paternalistic form of local government.
A feature of the feudal system of the Empire
was that authority was first centralized and then extensively
delegated. The role of the Emir was consequently of vital
importance, for on him everything turned.
The general rule, to which Zaria was an exception, was that there
was only one ruling family although within it the choice might lie
between several of its houses. In theory, any legitimate male
descendant of the founder was eligible for election, but in practice
the candidates were narrowed down to a small number by the
elimination of all those who lacked the requisite strength of
personality, experience of public affairs, and popular support.
When an election became necessary it was usual for each dynasty or
house of the ruling family to agree upon the candidate which it
intended to back and, consequently, elections sometimes became
contests between dynasties or houses rather than individuals. The
desirability of preserving a rotation among dynasties or houses was
also taken into account but could not always be met. The final
choice, as in the metropolitan Sultanate, was made by an Electoral
College consisting of the leading men of the Emirate who were not
members of the ruling family and, consequently, not themselves
eligible to stand for election.
Once elected the Emir found himself in a
position of great, but certainly not unbounded, authority.
·
The first limit to his power lay in the fact that he
was a vassal of the Sultan of Sokoto or Emir of Gwandu, as the case
might be, and had to retain the confidence of his overlord if he was
not to incur the risk of being deposed. The Sultans and Emirs of
Gwandu did not often take this extreme step, it is true, but cases
occurred from time to time. For example, in 1840 the Emir of Gwandu Halilu
deposed Usuman Zaki of
Nupe, as has already been related, while the Sultan Aliyu
Babba deposed Sarkin
Katsina Sidiku in 1844 8,
and Sarkin Hadeija Buhari in 1850 9. It was only in Zaria,
however, that depositions became at all common. There Sidi Abdul Kadir was deposed in 1853, Abdullahi in 1871 and again in 1881, and Sambo in 1888 10. Nevertheless, the
knowledge that the power was there and might be used against them
was enough to Put a curb on the conduct of all but the most
headstrong Emirs.
·
The second limitation to the authority of the Emirs
was to be found in the working of Islamic Law. Under it, and
especially under the doctrine of siyasa, they admittedly possessed
very wide powers. These were clearly defined, however, and could not
be exceeded. Nor was there any conception of droit administratif
which conferred exemption or legal privileges on members of the
ruling classes or even on the Emirs themselves. Indeed, as the law
was considered to be God-given and not man-made, the subordination
to it of even the highest in the land was accepted as being
perfectly natural. The Empire can therefore be said to have enjoyed
the rule of law. Moreover, in every Emirate this was safeguarded by
groups of divines and jurists who regarded themselves as being the
guardians of the true faith. Only men like Buhari
of Hadeija, who were completely ruthless and cared nothing for
public opinion, could ever hope to intimidate and silence these
fearless and outspoken men. Ordinary Emirs had to be careful not to
lay themselves open to their strictures.
·
Another limiting factor which certainly could not be
ignored, though it was perhaps less potent than Islamic Law, was
local tradition and convention. It was particularly effective in
curbing nepotism and preventing Emirs from going too far in
dismissing the officials appointed by their predecessors and filling
their posts with their own nominees. The watchdogs here were the
supporters of the rival dynasties or houses. The later history of
Kano provides a good example of what Emirs could and could not
achieve. When Muhammadu Bello
was Emir in the 'eighties he dismissed Yusufu, the son of his
predecessor, from the post of Galadima and appointed his own son
Tukur instead 11. In doing this he had two
aims, first to strengthen his own régime
by placing a man he could trust in a key post and second to groom Tukur
to follow him as Emir. Up to a point his manoeuvre was successful,
for during his life he enjoyed his son's support and after his death
Tukur was nominated by the Sultan to succeed him. In fact, however,
he had overreached himself and by going further than convention
permitted had alienated public opinion and aroused the bitter
hostility of the rival house of the dynasty. The sequel, as we shall
see, was the Kano civil war.
·
Another very important counterpoise to the power of
the Emirs was the vested interests of the Fulani nobility. Though
there were certain important differences, their standing was broadly
similar to that of the nobility of medieval Europe, that is to say
they enjoyed a privileged position and in return were obliged to
render military service whenever they might be called upon to do so.
They not only filled most of the posts in which their families had
hereditary interests but, thanks to the advantages which birth and
education gave them, they also secured most of the appointments that
were theoretically open to all. In this way they obtained the same
grip of the machinery of government, and became almost as much of a
power in the land as the aristocracy in eighteenth-century England.
This was as true of the central governments as of the administration
of the country districts. The Councils of the Emirates, for example,
were not formally constituted bodies with any fixed allocation of
seats. In theory, therefore, the Emirs needed to summon to them only
their own personal supporters 12.
In practice, however, it was almost impossible for them to exclude
the leading representatives of the great families such as the
Sullubawa in Katsina or the Yolawa and Dambazawa in Kano.
All these factors, while they combined to place
real limitations on the authority of the Emirs, still left them in
positions of great potential strength. In the last analysis,
therefore, the amount of power that they wielded depended mainly on
the force of their personalities, their skill in playing the
political game, and the length of their reigns. Some, like Abdullahi
who ruled Kano from 1855 to 1883, became complete autocrats. Others,
like Ahmadu of Hadeija, lacked the personality and standing to assert
themselves and always remained ciphers.
The administrations over which the Emirs presided were partly
bureaucratic, partly feudal, in nature. To sustain them, therefore,
public funds were required and these, for the most part, were raised
by means of taxes. Taxation, as we have already seen, had been
introduced into Hausaland at a very early date. The system which the
Fulani took over and developed was by no means uniform but
everywhere it fell into four
broad categories.
·
First of all there was the haraji, or kurDin kasa, which was a poll-tax or general tax on the
farming community.
·
Next there was jangali,
the tax on cattle, which the Fulani rather surprisingly did not
remit when they came to power.
·
Then there were death-duties which were levied
according to Moslem Law.
·
Finally, there was a miscellaneous group of
impositions on crafts and trade. In addition to all these there was zakka, the equivalent of the tithe of Christendom, but this was not
so much a secular tax as a more or less voluntary contribution to
funds devoted to religious or charitable purposes.
The method of assessing haraji varied from
Emirate to Emirate. In Katsina, for example, the head of every
household had to pay a flat rate of 2,500 cowries with an additional
500 cowries for every household slave. The total revenue from this
source was estimated by Barth in the middle of the century at 20-30
million cowries. In Kano the rate was the same but the revenue much
higher, probably about go million. In Zaria, on the other hand,
instead of a flat rate, free men paid 500 cowries in respect of
every member of the household, slave or free, who was capable of
wielding a hoe 13.
In 1860 there was a change to a flat rate of 2,000 cowries per
family and this gradually rose until by 1900 it had become 6,000
cowries14.
There is no doubt that before the jihad
this tax was also levied at comparable rates in Gobir, Kebbi, and
Zamfara. Under the Fulani, however, the territory of these three
States became the metropolitan region of the Dual Empire and
therefore the repository of the tribute paid by all the other
Emirates. This sufficed to keep the two Treasuries reasonably full.
The inhabitants of the Sultanate and the Emirate of Gwandu were
therefore excused from the payment of haraji
15.
This concession was one of the more important reforms in the Hausa
system which the Fulani made when they came to power.
Among the miscellaneous impositions some, such
as caravan tolls, dated back to the Hausa era and were in any case
practised all over black Africa. Others were innovations introduced
by the Fulani. By the end of the century, one way or another, duties
were being levied on a wide variety of objects such as canoes,
market-gardens, date palms, and dye-vats. Occupational taxes were
also imposed on such craftsmen and traders as blacksmiths, butchers,
tanners, leather workers, honey-gatherers, snuff-makers,
entertainers, and brokers 16.
The collection of these taxes was entrusted to the heads of the
craft guilds, almost invariably Hausas, who were recognized by the
Emir and given such titles as Sarkin Makera and Sarkin Fawa 17.
In these
hierarchical societies, indeed, titles played a most prominent part.
The tradition had of course come down from the Hausa era, but the
Fulani, forgetting Shehu's
teaching, perpetuated it with gusto. Each Emirate had its own set of
titles and among them the styles of :
·
Galadima
·
Madaki
·
Makama
·
Magajin Gari
·
Turaki
·
Chiroma
·
Dan Galadima
were usually to be found together with others
which were peculiar to the locality. Nor was the practice confined
to the capitals. Satellites and vassals had their own separate
hierarchies and even fief-holders and Village Heads often dignified
the standing of their henchmen and servitors by conferring on them,
in their humbler sphere, one of the great titles of the State.
In Sokoto the metropolitan Sultanate was
administered on much the same lines as the Emirates of the Empire.
As the States of Gobir and Zamfara, which composed the greater part
of it, had been broken up in the wars, there was no difficulty in
embodying them in the new structure. Had their people not deserted Shehu's
cause during the jihad,
the larger fragments of Zamfara might indeed have been accorded the
same degree of autonomy as the satellites of Zaria. But as it was,
Anka, Talata Mafara, and Gummi were given a lower status similar to
that of the Zaria vassals, that is to say the hereditary claims of
their dynasties were recognized and they were allowed a measure of
administrative, judicial, and fiscal control of their own affairs,
but in all matters of major importance their powers were strictly
circumscribed. The Burmawa of Bakura and Tureta were treated in the
same way. So too, when they returned to the fold, were the Gobirawa
of Sabon Birni.
Among the vassals of the Sultanate, former
Hausa Chiefs were only a small minority and the vast majority of the
feudatories were Fulani whose forbears had distinguished themselves
in the jihad. So far as the greater ones were concerned the practice of
Sokoto differed in an important respect from that of Zaria. There,
as we have seen, the growth of hereditary and quasi-heriditary
rights was held in check and most of the major fiefs remained in the
Emir's gift. In Sokoto, however, events were allowed to develop in
just the opposite way and hereditary succession became the general
rule.
Mention has already been made of the great
fiefs of Tambawal and Zurmi which were conferred on Buhari
dan Shehu and the heirs of Namoda. After two generations their
families were now unassailably established in possession of them. In
addition, there were many others of only slightly less importance in
which the hereditary rights of the families concerned had become
just as securely entrenched. For example, the descendants of Muhammadu
Moyijo and Muhammadu
Ashafa, whom we have already met, established similar liens on
the fiefs of Yabo and Gusau 18.
Likewise, the descendants of Shehu's
youngest son Isa, who had
been installed in Kwarre after the defeat and flight of Abdu Salami, had soon been recognized as having hereditary rights to
the succession, while the family of Muhammadu
Dadi, who at about the same time had helped Bello to subdue Abdu Salami's
rebellious ally Banaga dan
Bature, had acquired a no less enduring stake in the fief of
Maru 19. This process, moreover,
was by no means confined to the period of the jihad and its aftermath. In the early 'sixties, as has already been
described, the Sultan Ahmadu
Zaruku created the great fief of Gwadabawa and subsequently his
heirs lost no time in consolidating their title to it. Later, though
by different methods, the Sultans Aliyu Karami and Ahmadu Rufa'i
used their influence to establish hereditary rights for their
families in the fiefs of Isa and Silame which they had themselves
ruled before their elevation 20.
The proliferation of hereditary rights probably
went further in the Sultanate of Sokoto than in any other part of
the Empire except perhaps Gwandu. Moreover, it was not limited to
the territorial hierarchy and before long the great offices of the
Council and Court, including that of the Waziri, had also come to be
regarded as hereditary. Even the dignity of Chief justice became a
monopoly and was enjoyed by the family of Mallam Mustafa, whom Bello
had appointed in 1817, right down to the year 1898 21. This entrenchment of
privilege carried with it the germs of future decay, but the process
was to be a slow one and in the meantime the administration of the
Sultanate still seemed perfectly healthy,
As the government of the Empire rested largely
in the same hands as the administration of the Sultanate, it was of
course exposed to the same dangers. On the surface, however, it too
seemed sound enough. It was still based on the kofa
system that Bello had
introduced nearly two generations earlier. No Councillor had been
assigned special responsibility for imperial affairs and so the
brunt of the work fell on the Waziri who had in his portfolio the Emirates of Kano, Zaria, Adamawa,
Gombe, Hadeija, Katagum, Misau, Jama'are, and Air 22. To help him sustain this
burden, which involved a good deal of travelling, he was allowed to
appoint a deputy who, needless to say, was drawn from the same
family and given the title of Dan
Galadiman Waziri. Responsibility for the remaining Emirates was
shared by some of the other great families. Bauchi fell to the Magajin
Rafi and Katsina, Daura, and Kazaure to the Galadima 23
while Muri and Kontagora, two of the more recent Emirates whose
creation will be described in the next chapter, were assigned
respectively to Sarkin Rabah
and the Ubandoma 24.
Being the imperial power Sokoto was entitled to collect tribute from
its vassals. This was levied at the Islamic rate of one-fifth and
fell equally on revenue collected in peace and booty taken in war.
As the yield from booty was very volatile, the amounts remitted
tended to vary from Emirate to Emirate and from year to year. This
explains the large divergences in the accounts which have come down
to us. In 1853, for example, Barth was told that there were
·
30 horses
·
500 gowns
·
2,000,000 cowries
in the caravan bearing Zaria's tribute to
Sokoto and that similar instalments were dispatched every
second month. On the other hand, he learned that in the whole of
the previous year Katsina, from which similar contributions might
have been expected, had been able to scrape together only 800,000
cowries and a single stallion 25.
The discrepancy between these two sets of figures reflects the
difference in the situation of the two Emirates at that time, Zaria
being free to raid its weaker neighbours to the south while Katsina
was preoccupied in defending itself from the attacks of the Hausa
diehards in the north.
Forty years later another European traveller was informed that Kano
was the only Emirate rich enough to pay its way without having
recourse to slaves and that its tribute amounted to
·
100 horses
·
15,000 gowns
·
10,000 turbans
Katsina apparently made a mixed contribution of
100 slaves supplemented by
horses and currency. Bauchi and Adamawa, on the other hand, paid
entirely in slaves, 500 and
2,000, respectively 26.
According to still later sources, Muri's tribute at the end of the
century consisted of 100
slaves and 100 horses 27
while Kano's, after the civil war, was reduced to 100 horses and 1,000 gowns 28.
Whatever the precise amounts may have been, there is no doubt that
the flow of tribute into Sokoto, and to a lesser extent Gwandu, was
very considerable. At the
time it was regarded as a source of strength. In
the perspective of history, however, we can see that, like
the gold that poured into Spain from the Americas, it served only to soften the fibre of the people and hasten the decay
which soon began to attack the heart of the Empire.
Notes
1. M. G. Smith, op. cit. pp. 73-136.
2. M. G. Smith, op. cit. p. 77.
3. Ibid. pp. 78-79.
4. In Moslem jurisprudence there are many offences which do not come
within the scope of the Shari'a. Normally these are not tried in the
ordinary courts but dealt with by the Emir or, at a lower level, by
executive officials like District Heads who represent him.
5. M. G. Smith, op. cit. pp. 73-136.
6. Monthly and Quarterly Reports from Sokoto Province, 1903-6, now
in the National Archives, Kaduna.
7. In Government in Zazzau, M. G. Smith gives a map of the fiefs of
Zaria in the nineteenth century. This shows the extent of the
fragmentation and gives an indication of the large proportion of
fiefs held by the Galadima, Madaki, Alkali, Imam, and other high
officials of the Emirate who, in the nature of things, must have
been absentees.
8. Daniel, op. cit. p. 20.
9. Gazetteer of Kano Province, p. 22.
10. Gazetteer of Zaria Province, 1920, pp. 10-11.
11. Alhaji Abubakar, op. cit. pp. 59 and 61.
12. M. G. Smith, op. cit. pp. 118-20.
13. Barth, op. cit. vol II, p. 144.
14. M. G. Smith, op. cit. p. 94.
15. See the Monthly and Quarterly Reports from Sokoto Province,
1903-6. When Burden, the Resident, reported to Lugard, the High
Commissioner, that no haraji had hitherto been paid in Sokoto and
Gwandu, he was reprimanded for allowing the wool to be pulled over
his eyes. Nevertheless, he was right and Lugard was wrong.
16. M. G. Smith, op. cit. pp. 157-8 and the Gazetteer of Zaria
Province, pp. 16-17.
17. M. G. Smith, op. cit. pp. 85-86.
18. Sokoto DNBs, Histories of Yabo and Gusau.
19 Ibid. History of Maru.
20 Ibid. History of Isa and Silame.
21 Ibid. Historical Note on the Chief Alkalis.
22. Information furnished by Alhaji Junaidu.
23. Ibid.
24. Sokoto DNBs, Histories of Rabah and Hamma'ali.
25. Barth, op. cit. vol. IV, p. 127.
26. C. H. Robinson, Hawaland, London, 1896, p. 105.
27. Sokoto DNBs, History of Rabah.
28. Monthly and Quarterly Reports from Sokoto Province, 1903-6.
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